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HOW NOT TO DO MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE REFORM:
A FLORIDA CASE STUDY
Mary Coombst
INTRODUCTION
Malpractice reform has been a subject of scholarly attention and
efforts to reform the law for at least thirty years.' While there have
been efforts to put malpractice reform on the federal legislative agen-
da, none have succeeded. 2 Significant changes have occurred, how-
' With thanks to Patrick Gudridge, Lili Levi, Grayson McCouch and Ber-
nard Oxman. I particularly want to thank Art Simon, for sharing his knowledge and
insights about the Florida facts described herein, for providing entree to the various
interviewees and for encouraging me in the project, to Larry McPherson of the Flor-
ida Board of Medicine for guiding me through some of the relevant Florida govern-
ment data, and to all my interviewees. This could not have been done without the
assistance of Barbara Brandon and the rest of the University of Miami Law Librari-
ans. Earlier drafts of this article were presented at the University of San Diego, in
2006, and the University of Miami, the Health Law Professors Conference and the
Law & Society Association Conferences in 2007. Finally, for her extraordinary help,
thanks to my research assistant, Ashley Bruce.
I also want to express my gratitude to all the people whom I interviewed:
Paul Jess, Scott Carruthers and Debra Henley, the professional leadership of the
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers (hereinafter "AFrL"); Sandra Mortham, Jeff Scott
and John Knight, the professional leadership of the Florida Medical Association
(hereinafter "FMA"); Bob White, CEO of Florida Professional Insurance Corporation
(hereinafter "FPIC"); Dr. Carl Lentz, the President of the FMA in 2004-05, William
Large, Executive Director of the 2003 Governor's Task Force on Healthcare Profes-
sional Liability Insurance; Bill Bell, Executive Director of the Florida Hospital Asso-
ciation (hereinafter "FHA"), Mark Delegal, lobbyist for insurers, Robert Wychulis,
CEO of Florida Association of Health Plans, Rep. David Simmons (R.-Ocala), a key
drafter of the 2005 malpractice legislation; Gail Parenti, of the Florida Defense Law-
yers Association, and Lincoln Connolly, a plaintiff's malpractice attorney.
1 "In the mid-1970s, a crisis involving the availability of malpractice insur-
ance coverage in the United States led to the enactment of various first-generation tort
reform laws in several states. In the mid- 1980s, a crisis of affordability led to another
round of tort reform legislation in the most affected states" (citations omitted). Theo-
dore R. LeBlang, The Medical Malpractice Crisis-Is There A Solution?, 27 J. LEGAL
MED. 1, 2 (2006) (citations omitted).
2 H.R. 229, 104th Cong. § 7 (1995); H.R. 1091, 105th Cong. § 204 (1997);
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ever, at the state level.3 The vast majority of this change occurred
through legislative action, typically in the form of bills seeking to
institute various changes in the malpractice system. Some legislation,
following the model of California's Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act ("MICRA"), 4 focused on changing the system for mal-
practice litigation in order to control malpractice insurance costs and
to induce other changes that would improve the climate for health care
professionals and, indirectly, patients.5 Other statutes expanded their
focus to deal directly with the malpractice insurance industry, or to
reduce the level of patient-harming behavior by enhancing physician
discipline or supporting the patient safety movement.6
Some reform, however, has occurred through the citizen initia-
tive.7 While they are sometimes in the form of a more wide-ranging,
H.R. 5344, 106th Cong. § 4 (2000); H.R. 1639, 107th Cong. § 4 (2001); H.R. 321,
108th Cong. § 4 (2003). Failed Senate legislation: S. 11, 104th Cong. § 202 (1995);
S. 1370, 107th Cong. § 6 (2001).
3 "In 2005, 48 states introduced more than 400 bills in an attempt to address
'fevered calls for medical liability reform.' Moreover, at least 29 states passed more
than 50 medical malpractice tort reform bills that state governors signed into law."
LeBlang, supra note 1, at 7 (citations omitted).
4 Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA"), 1975 Cal. Stat. 34
94-4007, Codified at Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2 (1997).
5 See, e.g., TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § § 74.001-.507 (Vernon
2005 & Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-17 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007 2004);
Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.41 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.118 (West
2003).
6 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0271 (West 2004) (establishing the pa-
tient safety corporation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.1012 (West 2006) (creating the pa-
tient safety requirements for licensed facilities); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.64.010
(West Supp. 2008) (focusing on patient safety, malpractice insurance oversight, and
litigation); OR. REv. STAT. § 442.820 (2005) (establishing a patient safety commis-
sion).
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7In addition to the Florida initiatives discussed herein, voters in five other states faced
initiatives dealing with malpractice issues in the years between 2000 and 2006 :
Year State Kind Number Subject Result
2003 Texas Constitutional Proposition Noneconomic Pass
12 damage limit
2004 Nevada Statutory Question 3 Limit Pass
Contingency
Fees, plaintiff
recovery
Nevada Constitutional Question 4 Control Insur- Fail
ance Rates
Nevada Constitutional Question 5 Penalize Fail
lawyers for
frivolous suits
Oregon Constitutional Measure 35 Noneconomic Fail
damage limit
Wyoming Constitutional Amendment Mandatory Pass
C pre-suit panel
review or
arbitration
Wyoming Constitutional Amendment Authorize Fail
D limits for
noneconomic
damages
2005 Washington Statutory Initiative Noneconomic Fail
Measure damage limit;
Number 330 Contingency
Fee Limit;
Shorter stat.
limitations
2005 Washington Statutory Initiative Malpractice Fail
Measure ins. reg;
Number 336 License
revocation;
Limit number
of expert
witnesses
See Tex. Sec'y of State, Race Summary Report: 2003 Constitutional Amendment
Election, http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (last visited Apr. 11, 2008), for the
outcome of Texas Proposition 12; see Tex. Sec'y of State, Proposed Constitutional
Amendments September 13, 2003,
http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/2003sepconsamend.shtml (last visited Apr.
11, 2008), for a description of Texas Proposition 12; see Nev. Sec'y of State, 2004
Official General Election Results,
http://sos.state.nv.us/elections/results/2004GenerallElectionSummary.asp (last visited
Apr. 11, 2008); see Or. Sec'y of State, Official Results: November 2, 2004, General
Election, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/g04abstract.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2008), for information on the Oregon measures; see Wyo. Sec'y of State,
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legislative-like approach, initiatives are designed by the particular
entities that put them on the ballot. Most are thus very narrow, de-
signed for specific purposes, and they are not subject to legislative
reformulation. 8 In this paper, I present a detailed case study of one
such malpractice reform by initiative.
In Florida in 2004, three constitutional initiatives dealing with
malpractice reform were on the ballot. Amendment Three severely
restricted attorney contingency fees in malpractice suits. Amendment
Seven gave citizens access to reports of adverse incidents involving
hospitals and doctors with whom they had, or might have, a treatment
relationship. Amendment Eight required the revocation of the license
of any physician found to have committed an act of malpractice three
times . All passed easily. Two of these amendments have been largely
undermined by subsequent events which, in effect, returned the situa-
tion to something close to the status quo ante. The direct impact of
those two initiatives on the law surrounding malpractice and malprac-
tice litigation is thus likely to be minimal. Amendment Seven, how-
ever, was re-affirmed in a 2008 decision. The Florida Supreme Court
gave full effect to Amendment Seven, significantly changing prior
Florida law. 9
We can learn something about the process by which malpractice
reform occurs through a close examination of how each of these pro-
visions came about, and how each reflected the substantive and strate-
gic interests of one of the stakeholders in the medical malpractice
system. We can also use the opportunity to examine closely the mean-
ing and implications of the specific provisions on their face as limit
cases in the kinds of "reform" that may be enacted.
2004 General Election Official Results,
http://soswy.state.wy.us/electionl2004/results/04-gsum.htm (last visited Apr., 6,
2008), for the outcomes of the Wyoming measures; see Wyo. Sec'y of State, 2004
Ballot Issues, http://soswy.state.wy.us/election/2004/ballot.htm (last visited Apr., 6,
2008), for descriptions of the Wyoming measures; see Wash. Sec'y of State, 2005
General Election: Measures,
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/previous-elections.aspx (last visited Mar. 28,
2008), for information on the Washington measures.
8 The role the legislature may play in responding to an initiative varies
widely, and only in part by whether the initiative is in the form of a proposed statute
or constitutional provision. For example, statutory initiatives in California may not be
amended or repealed except by another initiative. Cal. Const. art. II § 10(c). In con-
trast, Washington has a provision for initiatives to the legislature, in which the legisla-
ture may counter with its own proposal. The electorate then has the opportunity to
choose which becomes law., WASH. CONST. art. II, sec. 1. See generally Kristen L.
Fraser Method, Procedure, Means, and Manner: Washington's Law of Law-making.
39 GoNz.L.REv. 447,454-56 (2003/04).
9 Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d. 478, (Fla. 2008).
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In Part One, I describe the Florida story: the initiative process in
the Florida Constitution, the legislative background, the initiative bat-
tle between the medical association and the trial lawyers, the subse-
quent legislative and judicial maneuvering, and the current status of
the three amendments. In Part Two, I assess what the amendments, in
the form anticipated by sponsors and voters, might have meant for
malpractice reform and the likely effect of these processes on the
prospects for such reform. Last, I provide a brief conclusion.
I. THE FLORIDA STORY
A. The Initiative Process
The initiative process in Florida is unusual and, as I hope to dem-
onstrate below, some of the particularities of that process help explain
how the physicians and trial lawyers used the initiative system and
why what they accomplished did not advance genuine reform.
Most initiative states are in the west; they adopted initiatives as a
means of giving voice to the people in the early part of the twentieth
century, when the legislature was seen as captive to special interests.
The forces behind initiatives were a confluence of populists, working
to advance the interests of farmers and workers, and progressives,
who sought a means to combat corruption.' ° In contrast, Florida
added the citizen initiative during the 1968 revision of its constitution.
Although the drafters adopted a well-established tool of governance,
they adopted a rather unusual variant of it. They seem to have been
responding to a quite different problem, the perception that prior con-
stitutions had been "larded with special interest amendments."" Thus
the goal was to add a variety of means to amend the constitution, in-
cluding the citizen initiative. 12 There is no evidence the drafters con-
sidered a provision for statutory initiatives.'
3
10 See Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of
Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1037, 1038-41 (2001); Nathaniel A.
Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referen-
dum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REv. 11
(1997).
n Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1358 (Fla. 1984) (McDonald, J.,
concurring).
12 FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. The new constitution simultaneously added a
provision for the use of a Constitution Revision Commission, FLA. CONST. art. XI, §
2, and provided procedural hoops to cabin the use of all the means of revision. See
Evans, 457 So. 2d at 1358 (McDonald, J., concurring). See generally P.K. Jameson &
Marsha Hosack, Citizen Initiatives in Florida: An Analysis of Florida's Constitutional
Initiative Process, Issues, and Statutory Initiative Alternatives, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
20081
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At the most general level, the Florida process is similar to that for
initiatives in other states. Proponents must file their proposed amend-
ment with a government authority, in this case the Secretary of State's
office. They must, using petitions clearly indicating what the proposed
amendment will say, gather a sufficient number of voters' signa-
tures. 14 The initiative is placed on the ballot at the next regularly
scheduled election, and becomes law if it receives a sufficient affirma-
tive vote.
15
There are three aspects of Florida's initiative process that make it
unusual. Each seems related to the fact that initiatives are only avail-
able to amend the constitution. First, the Florida Supreme Court re-
views proposed initiatives before they are placed on the ballot. Once
the proponents obtain ten percent of the required signatures and notify
the Secretary of State, they may request that the Secretary of State
submit the amendment to the Attorney General, who then petitions the
Supreme Court for an advisory opinion. 16 Both proponents and oppo-
nents of the amendment may brief and argue to the court.17 The advi-
sory opinion issued by the Florida Supreme Court addresses two is-
sues: whether the petition satisfies the Constitutional single subject
requirement ,1s and whether the ballot title and summary are clear and
unambiguous.19 This procedure avoids, in most cases, the particular
417, 424-25 (1995)
13 See TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 147-48 (1991) (stating that "the possibility that constitutional
initiative can be used for statutory initiative" has not been addressed). As
D'Alemberte notes, the citizenry can in effect force the legislature to act by placing in
the constitution a provision that states some specific provisions shall be binding "until
changed by law." Id. at 148. see FLA. CONST. art H, § 8 (i) (the ethics in government
provision, added by initiative in 1976).
14 In Florida, the required number is eight percent of the votes cast in the
most recent presidential election. As many other states do, Florida also requires that
there be a sufficient geographic dispersion of signatures, here by requiring that the
eight percent requirement also be met in at least one-half of the congressional dis-
tricts. FLA. CONST. art. XI § 3. See Div. of Elections, Fla. Dep't of State, Initiative
Procedures, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/init.shtml (last visited Feb. 11,
2008), for the processes for qualifying a proposed amendment in Florida.
15 In 2006, legislatively-proposed Amendment 3 passed, raising the required
vote from a simple majority to sixty percent. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
16 FLA. STAT. § 15.21, § 16.061 In any event, this review must occur before
the initiative is placed on the ballot.
17 FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 10; Art. V, § 3(b)(10).
18 FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
'9 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161 (West Supp. 2008), for these requirements.
See generally Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re The Medical Liability Claim-
ant's Compensation Amendment, 880 So. 2d 675, 676 (Fla. 2004) (setting out the
scope of review for these issues). Some critics have noted that there is no provision
[Vol. 18:373
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counter-majoritarian difficulty inherent when a court rejects a pro-
posal already approved by the majority of the voting citizens. 20
Second, while many states' laws indicate that initiatives must deal
with only a single subject, the Florida Supreme Court has taken this
requirement very seriously. It has provided several rationales for this
close review. First, because initiatives are constitutional, it is seen as
important "to insulate Florida's organic law from precipitous and
cataclysmic change. 22 Second, since citizen initiatives lack opportu-
nity for the kind of debate or amendment that inheres in the legislative
process, it is necessary to avoid "logrolling" which forces voters "to
accept part of a proposal which they oppose in order to obtain a
change which they support., 23 Finally, reflecting the nature of the
proposal as both citizen initiative and, if adopted, constitutional text,
the initiative should not "substantially alter or perform the functions
of multiple branches" of government, 24 or affect multiple sections of
the constitution in a way that is not clear to the electorate.25 Legal
for the Court to change a title or summary; if these are found misleading, it must
strike the proposal from the ballot. Harry Lee Anstead, et al., The Operation and
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida, 29 NOVA L. REv. 431, 491 (2005).
20 It does not eliminate this possibility, since other issues are not considered
in the advisory opinion and may provide a basis for voiding it after passage. See Pat-
rick 0. Gudridge, Complexity and Contradiction in Florida Constitutional Law and
cases discussed therein (manuscript on file with author).
21 "[The Florida Supreme Court is the only court in the United States that
has in recent years repeatedly treated the single-subject requirement as a real con-
straint on initiative-proposed state constitutional amendments." Patrick 0. Gudridge,
Florida Constitutional Theory (For Clifford Alloway), 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 809, 816
(1994).
22 In re Advisory Opinion to Attorney General - Save Our Everglades Trust
Fund, 636 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla.1994).
23 Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 988, 993 (Fla. 1984). It is perhaps worth
noting that logrolling is a condemnatory term, used with special force for initiatives.
In the context of legislative activity, logrolling might also be seen as the normal and
desirable process of forming coalitions in which each member seeks to advance his
position on the issues most salient to him, while agreeing to support the positions of
others on issues as to which he is relatively indifferent. Because elected representa-
tives interact over time and their votes are open, the process can occur over a series of
bills. This sort of "coalition-building" can still occur within a single proposal in the
initiative context. For example, California's Proposition 70 called for substantial new
funding on parks and specified about sixty particular projects, each supported by a
local environmental group that was expected to provide concrete support to help pass
the initiative. See PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALItoRNIA'S EXPERIENCE,
AMERICA'S FuruRE 217-18 (1998).
24 In re Advisory Opinion to Attorney General-Save Our Everglades, supra
note 22 (italics in original).
25 Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989. For a subtle and incisive analysis of the Florida
single-subject rule requirement, see Gudridge supra note 21, at 893-901 (concluding
20081
HEALTH MATRIX
scholars have disputed the desirability of both the current procedures
for judicial review, and the jurisprudence the Supreme Court has ap-
plied in these cases. 26 The pre-election procedure seems particularly
useful given the intense scrutiny Florida courts use when deciding if
the proposed change comports with the single subject rule. The assur-
ance that the proposal is clear may also serve as a partial substitute for
the provision that many other states have for a voter pamphlet. These
pamphlets provide each voter, well before the election date, a rela-
tively neutral description of each proposed initiative, sometimes to-
gether with summary arguments of proponents and opponents.
27
B. The 2004 Initiative Battle
Understanding the 2004 initiative battle requires a bit of historical
context. The Florida Medical Association leadership's decision to
propose Amendment Three was a response to what they saw as -their
failure to achieve what they had hoped in the legislature. In response
to one of the periodic malpractice crises,28 particularly acute in Flor-
ida, Governor Bush convened a Task Force in 2002, which held hear-
ings around the state, invited expert testimony, and produced a report
proposing a number of reforms. 29 The one it presented as most likely
to ameliorate the perceived problem was a $250,000 "hard" cap on
non-damages. 30 The Governor pressed the legislature to enact these
that the best explanation is that a proposal violates the single subject rule when it
overlaps with existing constitutional law in a way that leaves the courts with insuffi-
cient guidance as to how to properly interpret the resulting document).
26 See Jameson & Hosack, supra note 12, at 453-56.
27 Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.171 (West Supp. 2008) (indicating that Florida
only has the obligation to ensure that copies of constitutional amendments are posted
or available in booklet form at polling places on the day of election).
28 In an example of ddjA vu all over again, this reprised the situation in 1975
when a malpractice crisis had induced a legislative task force report and a "Compre-
hensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act." See Thomas Horenkamp, The New Flor-
ida Malpractice Legislation and Its Likely Constitutional Challenges, 58 U MIAMI L.
REV. 1285,1287 (2004)
29 See JOHN C. HITr, GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONAL LIABILIrY INSURANCE (2003),
available at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/myflorida/DOH-Large-Final%2OBook.pdf.
30 See id. at xvii ("The Task Force if of the opinion that... the centerpiece
and the recommendation that will have the greatest long-term impact on healthcare
provider liability insurance rates, and thus eliminate the crisis of availability and
affordability of healthcare in Florida, is a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages.").
The Task Force explicitly modeled its cap on non-economic damages after a parallel
provision in California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975. Id. at
193. The report set out sixty different recommendations, under these five headings:
healthcare quality, physician discipline, tort compensation, alternative dispute resolu-
tion, and insurance code reform. Id. at v-xvi. The presentation of the hard cap as
[Vol. 18:373
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reforms, both in the regular session, and in four special session he
called to deal specifically with malpractice reform. While the House
was an eager ally, the Senate was recalcitrant. 31 The general percep-
tion was that the trial lawyers had more influence in the Senate, while
the health care industry was the dominant influence in the House and
the Governor's mansion.32 The legislature finally passed a bill, but it
reflected the conflicting agendas of the different stakeholders.33 The
most disappointing feature to the doctors and hospitals was the liabil-
ity cap: it was $500,000 for physicians and $750,000 for hospitals, and
essential was designed, at least in part, to provide the basis to meet the Florida Su-
preme Court's prior decision indicating that such a rule, limiting access to courts,
would be constitutional if the legislature determined that it was essential to meet an
"overwhelming public necessity." Interview with William Large, Executive Director
of the 2003 Governor's Task Force on Healthcare Professional Liability Insurance,
Tallahassee, Fla. (December 5, 2006), (transcript at 2) (referring to University of
Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 196 (1993) holding that a limit on malpractice
litigation passed in response to an earlier crisis was constitutional under this test).
Oddly, although the malpractice insurers and FMA fought hard for this
proposal, both in the task force process and in the legislature, in my interview with
Bob White, of FPIC, he discounted the significance of a damage cap, given that many
Florida doctors carry no malpractice insurance and only a small number carry policies
larger than $250,000. Interview with Bob White, President, FPIC Ins. Group, Inc., in
Jacksonville Fla. (Dec. 15, 2006) (transcript at 1, on file with author). Cf. Kathryn
Zeiler, et al., Physicians' Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from
Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 59 (2007) (indicating that
insurance policy limits declined over time in real terms (Figure 7) and that out-of-
pocket payments by physicians were extremely rare, even when physicians carried
low limit policies (text at figure 5 and tables 5-6).
31 Horenkamp, supra note 28, at 1290.
32 See, e.g., Interview with the professional leadership of the Academy of
Florida Trial Lawyers in Tallahassee, Fla., (Dec. 4, 2006) [hereinafter AFTL inter-
view] (transcript, 3 on file with author); Interview with Dr. Carl Lentz, the President
of the FMA in 2004-05 in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 14, 2006) (transcript at 2 on file
with author) (claiming that "it was pretty obvious that [the recalcitrant Republican
Senators] had had some dealings with a trial lawyer.. and some threats").
33 See 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416 (passing a 94-page statute that did some things
that are particularly focused on patient safety, including requiring medical facilities to
adopt a patient safety plan, and requiring a course in limiting medical errors as an
obligatory part of continuing medical education; requiring that patients receive infor-
mation relevant to patient safety by ordering the Department of Health to create a
practitioner profile, which was to include records of malpractice actions, and have it
publicly accessible; and including provisions on malpractice insurance and physician
discipline). None of the stakeholders was completely satisfied, which may simply
reflect the expected outcome of a legislative process where there are conflicting inter-
ests. As one interviewee put it, "Nobody was happy, which meant it was probably the
right thing. See interview with Gail Parenti, of the Florida Defense Lawyers Associa-
tion in Miami, Fla. (Nov. 30 2006) (transcript at 2).
20081
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these limits were subject both to doubling in some specified circum-
stances and to a judicial override in others.34
The leaders of the Florida Medical Association ("FMA"), both the
professional staff and the incoming and outgoing elected leaders, were
unwilling to accept this result. At the annual FMA convention, only
days after the end of the last special session of the Florida legislature,
those leaders decided it was time for war. The new President of the
FMA, Dr. Carl Lentz, put on his flak jacket from his days in the mili-
tary and told the assembled delegates that "this is a blood sport" and
they "need to be prepared for war."35 The FMA planned to seek a con-
stitutional initiative to sidestep what they saw as the capture of the
Florida Senate by trial lawyers. The proposed amendment, however,
would not respond directly to the failure to get hard non-economic
damage caps. Instead it sought a cap on attorney's contingency fees in
malpractice actions.36 The shift from damage caps to fee caps has
been explained in different ways. Some suggested that attorney fee
caps were always the most desirable reform, but had not been the fo-
cus of legislative efforts because, under Florida's separation of pow-
ers, any such bill might be struck down by the Florida Supreme Court
as trenching on its authority over the judicial system.37 Others sug-
gested that a cap on damages would be less attractive to voters, and
thus less likely to pass.38 Finally, the FMA, after consulting with the
34 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 416 § 54, codified in FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2003). The
caps were doubled if the patient was left in a permanent vegetative state (though this
would seem to reduce any pain-and-suffering or conscious loss of enjoyment) and
could be increased if the trial court determined that the non-economic harm was "par-
ticularly severe."
35 Interview with Dr. Carl Lentz, supra note 32, (transcript at 3).
36 The amendment stated that "in any medical liability claim involving a
contingency fee, the claimant is entitled to receive no less than 70% of the first
$250,000 in all damages received by the claimant, exclusive of reasonable and cus-
tomary costs" and "90% of all damages in excess of $250,000." FLA. CONST., art I §
26.
37 See, e.g., Interview with Gail Parenti, supra note 33, (transcript at 4);
Interview with Sandra Mortham, Jeff Scott and John Knight, the professional leader-
ship of the Florida Medical Association in Tallahassee, Fla. (Dec. 4, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter FMA interview] (transcript at 2) (suggesting that task force had indicated that a
contingency fee cap could not be done legislatively). There had been a limitation on
attorney's fees as part of legislative malpractice reform in 1985, but its constitutional-
ity was never determined because at the time it was challenged as unconstitutional,
the court adopted the same schedule as a court rule for all personal injury actions. See
Fla. Bar re Amendment to the Code of Prof'l Responsibility (Contingent Fees), 494
So. 2d 960, 961-62 (Fla. 1986).
38 Interview with Dr. Carl Lentz, supra note 32, (transcript at 4) (noting that
arguments over the amount of a damage cap are complicated and the contingency fee
cap "sells better to the public").
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head of the largest malpractice insurer in Florida, concluded that an
attorney fee cap was the change most likely to reduce the number and
size of malpractice awards, and thus to solve what the doctors saw as
the central problem needing reform.39
The trial lawyers were already prepared for the possibility of such
a battle. In 1988 the physicians had placed a constitutional amend-
ment imposing a $250,000 hard cap on non-economic damages on the
ballot. The trial lawyers expended millions of dollars in order to de-
feat the proposal.40 After the fight ended, the leadership of the Acad-
emy of Florida Trial Lawyers (the "Academy") 41 vowed that they
would never again be the only ones at risk in an election.42 They chose
to create a stockpile of weapons, and had drafted, tested and redrafted
a number of possible initiatives, which were ready for use.43 The
Academy described this strategy as "a policy similar to the mutual
assured destruction policy" between the US and the USSR;44 the pri-
39 Interview with Bob White, supra note 30,(transcript at 2-3); Interview
with Dr. Carl Lentz, supra note 32, (transcript at 4); Interview with Mark Delegal,
lobbyist for insurers, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Dec. 4, 2006) (transcript at 3) (the attorney
fee cap will "take the fuel away from the engine" of malpractice litigation); FMA
interview, supra note 37, (transcript at 2).
40 AFTL interview, supra note 32, (transcript at 3). Amendment 10, entitled
"Limitation of Non-Economic Damages in Civil Actions," lost; 56.6% votes against it
and 43.4% votes for it. See Div. of Elections, Fla. Dep't of State, Initia-
tives/Amendments/Revisions, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initiativelist.asp
(last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (query "Year: 1988" and "Status: Defeated"). The Florida
Hospital Association had considered another attempt at a constitutional damages cap
before the 2003 session but concluded that they were more likely to succeed in the
legislature. Interview with Bill Bell, General Counsel, Fla. Hosp. Ass'n, in Tallahas-
see, Fla. Dec. 4 2006 (transcript at 2). The unattractiveness of the constitutional
amendment route may have been influenced by the hostile response of the AFTL.
AFTL interview, supra note 32, (transcript at 2).
41 The Academy has since changed its name to the Florida Justice Associa-
tion. http://www.floridajusticeassociation.org/aboutAFL.asp (last visited Oct, 22,
2008). In this article I continue to use the name of the organization at the relevant
time.
42 As Dr. Lentz remembered it, an AFrL leader said that after 1988 "we would
never, ever go on the defensive again. We are going on the offensive. And we are going
to take you out." Interview with Dr. Carl Lentz, supra note 32, (transcript at 5).
43 These were designed to threaten the interests of those, such as the insur-
ance industry and the business community, who might ally with physicians and hospi-
tals and provide funding for anti-trial lawyer proposals. AFTL interview, supra note
32, (transcript at 2-3). This strategy was not unique to the organized trial bar in Flor-
ida. Trial lawyers in California similarly "employed a counter proposition strategy" to
seek to deflect the propositions of tort reformers. TODD DONOVAN, SHAUN BOWLER,
DAVID MCCUAN AND KEN FERNANDEz, CONTENDING PLAYERS AND STRATEGIES:
OPPOSmON ADVANTAGES IN INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS 80, 85 IN CITZENs AS
LEGISLATORS (Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Caroline J.Tolbert, eds.1998).
44 AFTL interview, supra note 32, (transcript at 2).
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mary goal was not to have the proposals enacted, but to use them as a
threat to dissuade others from pressing for initiatives the trial lawyers
saw as attacks. The potential weapons at this time included initiatives
45more closely regulating insurance rates, imposing an obligation on
health care providers to charge no patient more than the lowest rate
they charged Medicaid and health insurance plans,46 as well as what
became Amendments Seven, "Patients' Right to Know About Ad-
verse Medical Incidents," and Eight, "Prohibition Of Medical License
After Repeated Medical Malpractice. ' 4
7
Using the proposals as threats, the Academy leadership tried to
persuade the FMA not to go forward, but were rebuffed.48 The Acad-
emy also took their arguments to a variety of other stakeholders: As-
sociated Industries of Florida, the Florida Chamber of Commerce, the
Florida Association of Health Plans and the Florida Insurance Coun-
cil. 49 The leaders of these groups coalesced around an agreement to
urge the FMA to back off, so that none of the Academy's proposals
would be on the ballot.50 The FMA, however, refused their entreat-
45 The trial lawyer's group, Floridians for Patient Protection, filed an
amendment "Requiring New Standards for Insurance Rating," which was withdrawn
in 2004. Div. of Elections, supra note 40 (query "Year: 2004" and "Status: With-
drawn").
46 See id. (query "Year: 2008" and "Status: Active"), for Floridians for Pa-
tient Protection's "Physician Shall Charge the Same Fee for the Same Health Care
Service to Every Patient," which is still listed as "active" in 2010.
47 See id. (query "Year: 2004" and "Status: Passed"), for the outcomes and
full text of each amendment.
48 Interview with Carl Lentz, supra note 32, (transcript at 5-6). AFTL tried
unsuccessfully to negotiate with physicians outside FMA through county and spe-
cialty medical societies. AFTL interview, supra note 32, (transcript at 5).
49 The AFTL also spoke with the FHA, but they were apparently not part of
the coalition induced to oppose the FMA. The Executive Director of the FHA recalls
that, though he had engaged in discussions with the trial lawyers, the organization
independently decided that it would not support the FMA proposal and was not part
of the coalition. Interview with Bill Bell, supra note 40, (transcript at 2-3).
5o See Letter from Associated Industries, Florida Chamber of Commerce,
Florida Insurance Council and Florida Association of Health Plans to Florida Medical
Association (Nov. 19, 2003) (on file with author) . The threat to the insurance indus-
try's anti-trust exemption led the Florida Insurance Council to insist that FPIC go
along, a precondition to the trial lawyers agreeing not to go forward with that initia-
tive. Interview with Bob White supra note 30,(transcript at 4). Delegal, the FPIC
lobbyist, describes the proposed amendment as "bullets and guns pointing at our
heads", Interview with Mark Delegal, supra note 39, (transcript at 3). White said the
technique was "blackmail," while also describing Amendment Three as "too extreme
to be widely accepted as a credible civil justice reform". The FMA leadership also
used the word "blackmail," and bemoaned that the others "didn't have the guts to
move forward on our proposal," John Knight, FMA interview, supra note 37, (tran-
script at 2).
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ies. 51 The Academy did obtain a partial victory; the coalition members
agreed that they would not support Amendment Three, either by
speaking out in favor of it, or by providing money for it.52 In return,
the Academy agreed not to go forward with any proposal other than
Amendments Seven and Eight. 53
The battle between trial lawyers and doctors was now joined. The
Florida Supreme Court approved all three proposals in its pre-election
review? 4 All the proposals obtained the necessary signatures. The
51 Letter from Florida Medical Association to Associated Industries, Florida
Chamber of Commerce, Florida Insurance Council and Florida Association of Health
Plans (Nov. 24, 2003) (on file with author). See generally interview with Dr. Carl
Lentz, supra note 32, (transcript at 5). Delegal described the negotiations between
coalition members and FMA as involving "shouting matches" and reported a com-
ment by Lentz that "these lawyers are terrorists and they need to be treated like terror-
ists and we don't negotiate with terrorists." Interview with Mark Delegal, supra note
39.
52 Interview with Mark Delegal, supra note 39, (transcript at 4). Associated
Industries also sent a letter to each physician in Florida urging them not to support the
amendment. Letter to Florida physicians from Associated Industries (Jan. 30, 2004)
(on file with author). The FMA leadership noted that, while most were silent, some
business groups came out against amendment three, a position they found "shocking."
They noted that the Chamber of Commerce, part of the coalition, had earlier indicated
that such a limit would be part of their legislative agenda. Jeff Scott, the FMA associ-
ate general counsel, suggested that the business interests were opposed in general to
the initiative process. FMA interview, supra note 37, (transcript at 4).
53 As they described it the other proposals remain available as bullets for
another day. AFTL interview, supra note 32, (transcript at 5-6).
54 See text at nn. 16-20 supra. Substantial questions were raised by the oppo-
nents of each amendment in the arguments before the Florida Supreme Court. In
regard to Amendment Three, Justice Lewis, joined by Justice Anstead, dissented,
finding that the ballot title and summary did not provide fair notice to the voters.
Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re The Medical Liability Claimant's Compensa-
tion Amendment, 880 So. 2d 675, 682 (Fla. 2004). He argued that the court should
look behind the direct effect of providing the claimant a larger share of any recovery
and find the summary misleading for not making clear that the "singular and only
purpose" of the amendment, was to "imped[e] a citizen's access to the courts and that
citizen's right and ability to secure representation for a redress of injuries"' Id. at 683.
The Court unanimously concluded that Amendment Seven comprised only a single
subject and that the title and summary were accurate in saying that current law "re-
stricted" access to information about adverse medical incidents, since the amendment
would broaden the right to such information. Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re
Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, 880 So. 2d 617 622 (Fla.
2004). Finally, the Court majority found no defect in Amendment Eight, despite ar-
guments that it was misleading. Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re Pub. Prot.
from Repeated Med. Malpractice, 880 So. 2d 667, 673-74 (Fla. 2004). In dissent,
Justice Bell contended that the summary was misleading by stating that "[c]urrent law
allows medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice to [remain li-
censed]." Id. at 674-75. While Justice Bell argued that this could suggest that there
was no mechanism under current law to revoke licenses in such situations, id. at 675,
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FMA proudly pointed out that they had obtained most of their signa-
tures by having doctors keep petitions in their offices where they
urged patients to sign them.55 The election campaign was quite ex-
pensive. One public interest organization estimated the total spending
exceeded $8.5 million by the proponents of Amendment Three, and
$25 million by its opponents. 56
Almost all the efforts by both sides focused on Amendment
Three, because polling indicated strong voter support for Amend-
ments Seven and Eight.57 The editorials in the state's major newspa-
pers were overwhelmingly negative towards all three amendments. 58 It
made no difference to the voters. The polling was accurate and Seven
and Eight both passed easily.59 Amendment Three, entitled "Claim-
ant's Right to Fair Compensation," was not quite as popular, but even
it received more than the sixty percent super majority since imposed
for citizen initiatives.6° The proponents' story line was clear and easy
the majority concluded that the amendment, as suggested by the summary, would
impose a stricter limitation than under current law. Id. at 672 (majority opinion).
55 FMA interview, supra note 37, (transcript at 13) ("we did not do what the
trial bar did which was go out and buy them all"). Its expressed distaste for profes-
sional signature gathering companies may be slightly self-serving, since the AFTL
battle plans included placing all the major signature gathering firms under contracts
that forbade them from working for the FMA. AFTL interview, supra note 32, (tran-
script at 6).
56 This data is calculated from a Ballot Initiative Strategy Center's report.
See DANIEL SMITH, BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., MONEY TALKS: BALLOT
INITIATIVE SPENDING IN 2004 at 8 (2006), available at http://www.ballot.org/ (search
for "Money Talks"; then follow the "Money Talks: The 2004 Buyer's Guide" hyper-
link). These numbers are somewhat higher than the estimates of the FMA and the
AFTL; the latter noted that a large portion of its money was spent on the efforts to
avoid the election campaign. AFTL interview, supra note 32, (transcript at 6).
57 "No one fought for 7 & 8; ... it just passed," Interview with Mark Dele-
gal, supra note 39, (transcript at 5). Dr. Lentz also explained the FMA's position by
arguing that Amendment 8 could safely be ignored since it would be changed by the
legislature (as happened) to a form that largely eliminated its risk for physicians.
Interview with Dr. Carl Lentz, supra note 32, (transcript at 6).
58 The newspapers in the three largest areas - Tampa, Orlando, and Mi-
ami/Fort Lauderdale - recommended a no vote on all three amendments. Of the eight
other newspapers included in the Westlaw database the only exceptions to this posi-
tion were that one recommended a positive vote on three and three recommended a
positive vote on seven (data available from author). Governor Bush, who had been
very active in pressing the 2003 legislation, was largely silent on the fight over the
amendments (which occurred simultaneously with his brother's re-election cam-
paign). Interview with William Large, supra note 30, (transcript at 5).
59 Amendment Seven received 81.2% of the votes and Amendment Eight
received 71.2%. See Div. of Elections, supra note 40 (query: "Year: 2004" and
"Status: Passed").
60 See id. (passing with a 63.6% vote). Ironically, the legislatively proposed
super-majority initiative itself obtained only 57.8% of the vote. See id. (query "Year:
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to understand: You, the plaintiff, were injured. You, the plaintiff, not
your greedy lawyer, should receive the lion's share of the damages.61
The counter-arguments are more complex, in part because they re-
quire focusing the voter's attention not simply on what the amend-
ment said, but on the real-world consequences of enacting it .62
So, on November 2, 2004, three new provisions became part of
the Florida constitution. Let us put aside for the moment what effect
each of these would have had had on malpractice and/or malpractice
litigation,63 had they taken effect in precisely the way their proponents
intended (and, presumably, as the voters might have assumed they
would). Two of them certainly will not; the third may do so, but it is
still too early to make an entirely accurate assessment. We now sepa-
rate our story into three strands, looking at the post-enactment story of
each of the amendments.
C. Amendment Three
Even before Amendment Three passed and became Art. I, Sec-
tion 26 of the Florida Constitution, the Academy, representing the trial
lawyers, considered how it might be interpreted to do the least damage
to their interests. 64 The conclusion many of them seemingly reached
2006" and "Status: Passed").
61 That story line "sells pretty easily," Interview with Dr. Carl Lentz, supra
note 32, (transcript at 4). See also FMA interview, supra note 37, (transcript at 4)
("the victim[s] ... need to have their fair share and the greedy trial lawyers are not
who they need to be concerned about.")
62 The FMA described the anti-Three campaign as one where the trial law-
yers "had probably six different messages and obviously nothing was working,"
FMA interview, supra note 37, (transcript at 4). The trial lawyers described the cam-
paign of sequential ads as needed to communicate a "more sophisticated" message.
Id. at8.
There would have been a similar message problem with combating Amendment
Seven, had anyone thought it worthwhile to spend the resources to try. No on Seven
"is a particularly difficult message to package and sell to the public, especially when
they're looking at an amendment that says 'right to know'." " Everybody wants to
know. I want to know. And it's a difficult message to sell especially on short notice
with no budget to be able to articulate why it's important to keep information confi-
dential." Interview with Gail Parenti, supra note 33, (transcript at 6).
63 These questions are considered in Section III, infra.
64 In addition to the technique described in the text for avoiding the impact of
Amendment Three, the trial lawyers suggested to me that they could use the initia-
tive's wording to argue that it required that plaintiffs receive seventy/ninety percent of
the actual damages as assessed by the jury and thus that amendment three makes
statutory caps on non-economic damages unconstitutional. AFTL interview, supra
note 32, (transcript at 9). In their briefs to the Supreme Court during the post-
Amendment Three struggle, trial lawyers had suggested that it would trump any sub-
rogation or hospital lien claims insofar as they would reduce what the plaintiff re-
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was that this constitutional right of clients, like other constitutional
rights, such as the right to a jury trial,, could be waived.65 Trial law-
yers proceeded to ask new clients, in at least some cases, to do so and
thus to agree to a higher fee, though still within the fee limits set by
the ethics rules of the Florida Bar..66 The proponents of Amendment
Three were, to put it mildly, not happy.67 To some extent, they were
trapped by their own political choices. The caps on attorneys' contin-
gency fees in other states are drafted as a limit on how much attor-
neys may charge their clients.68 In contrast, Article I, § 26 is written in
ceived from the judgment below this level. See Comments and Objections to Pro-
posed Amendment to Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida
Bar at 7-8, In re Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)
of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, 939 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2006) (No. SC05-1150).
65 See Florida Doctors, Lawyers at Odds over Effects of Malpractice
Amendments, INS. J. (Southeast News), Nov. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/southeast12004/11/05/47480.htm (noting the
comments of Alexander Clem, then-President of the AFTL)..
66 Under the Florida rules of professional conduct, these caps are 40% of the
first $1 million of the recovery, 30% of the next $1 million and 20% of anything
above that. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(ii) (2008), available
at
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/PI/WebNodes.nsf/Nodes/D4775989DE9COC8A
85256FEF005FDB40. These amounts are increased if the trial court judgment is
appealed, lowered if the recovery is obtained before the filing of an answer or the
demand for appointment of arbitrators, and lowered still more if all defendants admit
liability at the time they file their answers and request a trial only on damages. Id.
67 Bob White of FPIC said that he had raised this risk earlier with the FMA
but that they had replied that "the Supreme Court won't let" the lawyers obtain a
waiver from their clients. Interview with Bob White, supra note 30, (transcript at 5).
The parties seeking to dissuade the FMA had raised the risk of plaintiffs' attorneys
indirectly undermining of the cap by charging hourly fees and then waiving them in
whole or in part or, worse, by proposing a prevailing party fee shifting provision
through legislation or initiative. Letter from Associated Industries of Florida, Florida
Insurance Council, Florida Chamber of Commerce, and Florida Association of Health
Plans to Florida Medical Association, supra note 50, at 7-8. William Large, though he
thought the cap should never have been in the constitution, also thought it should be
enforced as written once it had passed. Interview with William Large, supra note 30,
(transcript at 7). See also FMA interview, supra note 37, (transcript at 7). Cf
ELISABETH R. GERBER, ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE GOVERNMENT
RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 13 (2001) (noting, in the context of governmental
resistance to implementing initiatives, that vague language in initiatives, chosen to
enhance the chance of passage, may "backfire when it is time for implementation").
68 Casey L. Dwyer, Note, An Empirical Examination of the Equal Protection
Challenge to Contingency Fee Restrictions in Medical Malpractice Reform Statutes,
56 DUKE L J. 611, 615-16 & nn.20-22 (2006) (listing numerous statutes and regula-
tions of this type); see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
18 § 6865 (1999); Mich. Ct. Rules Ann. § 8.121(b) (Lexis 1998); 5 Oki. S. Ann. § 7.
Even in Nevada, which also imposed caps in 2004 by initiative, the proposal created a
statutory cap drafted as a limit on attorneys. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7.095 (Lex-
[Vol. 18:373
HOW NOT TO DO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
terms of the percentage of the recovery that "the claimant is entitled to
receive." The possibility of waiver is built into the language of the
provision. But that language is surely not inadvertent. A majority of
the electorate voted for a provision titled "claimant's right to fair
compensation." That might have been held to be misleading if the text
was drafted as a regulation of what lawyers can charge. And the
amendment might not have been so intuitively attractive to voters if it
had been titled, "restriction on attorney fees in medical liability
cases."
Since the Bar seemed disinclined to step in, lawyers who had rep-
resented the FMA 69 collected the signatures of more than fifty Florida
attorneys, thus triggering a process whereby the Florida Supreme
Court would have to consider their petition seeking to make it an eth-
ics violation to seek such waivers of client's constitutional rights.
70
The Court referred the issue to the Florida Bar to study it and report
back.71 The Bar in turn created a Special Committee which held hear-
ings and drafted a proposed rule, which the Bar approved.72 Under
that rule, a lawyer may ethically seek and obtain a waiver from his or
her client and an agreement to pay a contingency fee higher than that
set out in Art. I, sec 26. To do so, the lawyer must follow procedures
described in the rule, and the waiver must track a form included
therein.
After an additional comment period,73 the Florida Supreme Court
issued an opinion in which it adopted the Bar's proposed rule with
isNexis Supp. 2005) (stating that "[a]n attorney shall not contract for or collect a
contingent [fee in an action] against a provider of health care based upon professional
negligence in excess of...").
69 This effort was led by Stephen Grimes, a former Florida Supreme Court
justice, who had represented the FMA. The other signatories to the petition were
almost all either lawyers or lobbyists who represented the health care industry in
Tallahassee or members of Grimes' law firm, Holland + Knight. Comments and Ob-
jections To Proposed Amendment to Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Trial Lawyer Section
of the Florida Bar, at 5 (Submitted to Supreme Court of Florida in connection with
Case No. SC05-1150.
70 See RuLEs REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 1-12.1 (f) (West 2003).
71 Notice of Filing at 1, In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla.
Bar - Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, 939 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2006)
(No. SC05-1150). The Court references this filing in its final opinion of the matter.
939 So. 2d at 1037.
72 Notice of Filing, supra note 71, at 1-2, Exhibit C (providing text of the
proposed rule).
73 During both the stage after the initial petition was filed and after the Bar
filed its proposed rule, the Supreme Court received hundreds of comments. See 939
So. 2d 1032, 1037 n. 2.
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minor modifications. 74 The opponents of the proposed rule had argued
that the constitutional provision "embrace[d] certain policies that are
beyond the control of the claimants themselves." The court responded
that "on its face, article I, section 26 unquestionably creates a per-
sonal right, one for the direct benefit of a medical malpractice claim-
ant," and that such a right, like other fundamental constitutional rights
could be waived.75 The Court then rejected the arguments that a judi-
cial hearing was required for the contract to be effective;76 they
deemed it sufficient that clients know they could request such a hear-
ing if they wished."
The ultimate result of Amendment Three and the corresponding
ethics rule is unclear. Anecdotal evidence from trial lawyers is that
they seek waivers in any case where the constitutional fee cap would
erode the financial incentive to take the case. The process requires
"up-front" time with the client to explain, but, they say, no client has
taken the option of leaving and seeking an attorney who would take
74 Id. at 1037, 1039.
75 Id..at 1038. More precisely, they approved modifications to the Rules of
Professional Conduct which allowed attorneys to seek waivers without violating these
rules, while stating that they "decline[d] to actually determine the legal issue of
whether [these] rights... may be waived." Id. at 1038, 1039. The broader interests
asserted by opponents related to the claim that a major purpose of the amendment was
to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits, which would curb the costs of medical
malpractice insurance and, in turn, reduce the costs of health care. See Comments of
American Medical Ass'n and Mississippi State Medical Ass'n in Support of the Peti-
tion at 7-8, In re Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)
of the Rules of Prof 1 Conduct, 939 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2006) (No. SC05-1150).
76 939 So. 2d at 1038-39. The court indicated that an important basis for this
decision was the representation by the Florida Bar that judges who were consulted
indicated that judicial fee reviews under the prior rule are ex parte and thus "in effect,
a form over substance requirement." Id. at 1040 n.4 (quoting Notice of Filing, supra
note 71, at 4). See Gary Blankenship, Med Mal Fee Waiver Procedures Argued, FLA.
B. NEWS, July 1, 2006,
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews0l .nsf/Articles?OpenView&Start--4
4.15&Count=30&Expand=44#44 (describing the oral arguments). Since any manda-
tory review of a fee agreement would have to occur before the contract of representa-
tion was signed, it could create serious problems for potential clients given the short
statute of limitations for these actions and the requirement of a pre-suit investigation
and preparation of expert affidavit under Florida law. See id. The opinion also ignored
the debate at oral argument whether a judge should refuse to permit a waiver absent a
finding that the client could find no attorney willing to take the case without a waiver.
See id.
7 See 939 So. 2d at 1040. Since the client is always free not to agree to a
waiver and the attorney is always free not to agree to represent the client absent a
waiver, a non-mandatory pre-contractual judicial review is a rather meaningless ges-
ture.
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the case at the constitutionally set fee limit.78 On the other hand, the
head of FPIC, the largest malpractice insurer in Florida, and the ex-
ecutive leadership of the FMA claim that the amendment continues to
have the effect its proponents sought.79 They say that some lawyers
have withdrawn from the field, moving out of Florida, or shifting their
practice away from medical malpractice.80 The lack of data makes it
impossible to move beyond impressions, perhaps consciously or un-
consciously colored by self-interest. At least some lawyers' practices
are essentially unchanged; undoubtedly some lawyers are doing fewer
malpractice cases, or moving their practices out of Florida, but there
81
are too many other potential causes to judge the impact of this one.
78 Interview with Lincoln Connolly, Plaintiffs' Attorney, in Miami, Fla.(Dec.
18, 2006) (transcript at 12 on file with author) (explaining that the process of explain-
ing the process to a client is "a pain in the neck," but that, once you do so, the clients
will agree). Debra Henley of AFTL concurred. AFTL interview, supra note 32 (tran-
script at 11-12). Mark Delegal, who lobbies on behalf of insurance companies con-
cluded that "the amendment has been gutted," though he recognized his clients at
FPIC viewed the situation differently. Interview with Mark Delegal, supra note 39,
(transcript at 7).
9 John Knight of FMA was "ecstatic" that Three was in the constitution and
believed "it is having an effect every day." FMA interview, supra note 37, (transcript
at 7). See also Interview with Bob White, supra note 30, (transcript at 5). Large said
that "ethical lawyers" will not seek waivers. Interview with William Large, supra
note 30, (transcript at 6). The FMA responded to the Supreme Court's decision
declining to make it unethical to seek waivers with the assertion that it "would en-
courage its members to have patients sign a waiver stating that they will not sue their
doctor for more than $250,000 in noneconomic damages." Jordana Mishory, Medmal
Plaintiffs Can Waive Fee Caps, DAILY BusINEss REviEw Al, A16 (Sept. 29, 2006)
(quoting Sandra Mortham). There is no indication that doctors are doing so, presuma-
bly because the situations are legally distinct. Such contractual limitations on dam-
ages from future incidents of malpractice are, as they always were, unenforceable
under the theory that they violate public policy. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the
University of California, 383 P. 2d 441 (Cal. 1963), adopted in Florida by Banfield v.
Louis, 589 So.2d 441, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1991). Presumably the FMA would
argue that there are no strong public policy needs to ensure access to the essential
service of a malpractice attorney.
go Interview with Mark Delegal, supra note 39, (transcript at 7) (some law-
yers moved a medical malpractice practice to Georgia).
81 One trial lawyer saw this as simply one of a number of changes that made
bringing a malpractice suit more complicated or expensive, creating "more hoops to
go through," and that it was probably true that some lawyers no longer took these
cases. Interview with Lincoln Connolly, supra note 78, (transcript at 6). Another
pointed to the non-economic damage caps, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.118 (West Supp.
2008), and the near-elimination of the bad faith claims against insurance companies, §
766.1185, which were part of the 2003 legislative reform (the latter had sometimes
allowed plaintiffs to collect more than the often low policy limits), along with the
total elimination of joint and several liability in mid-2006 with the enactment
of.section 768.81 as more significant impediments. Telephone conversation with
Scott McMillen in Miami, Fl. (March 15 2007). The 2003 legislation also tightened
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D. Amendment Eight
Amendment Eight, which became Art. X, Section 26, of the con-
stitution, has been referred to as 'Three Strikes and You're Out. '8 2 As
written, it would seem to require that a physician's license be revoked
on the occurrence of the third strike, where a strike is a finding by the
Board of Medicine, a court or an arbitration panel that the physician
had engaged in an act of malpractice. 3
Bills were quickly pre-filed for the 2005 session of the Florida
legislature to "fix" the problems with Amendment Eight.84 With rela-
tive ease, a bill doing just that passed. 5 Under the statute, a number
the requirements for a pre-suit investigation. § 766.106.
82 Editorial Keep Malpractice Fight Out of State Constitution, PALM BEACH
POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at 18A ("[p]laintiffs' attorneys advertise it as a 'three-strikes-and-
you're-out' solution to the problem of bad doctors"). The official ballot title was,
"Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice;" the summary read:
Current law allows medical doctors who have committed repeated malpractice to be
licensed to practice medicine in Florida. This amendment prohibits medical doctors
who have been found to have committed three or more incidents of medical malprac-
tice from being licensed to practice medicine in Florida.
83 The text of the constitutional provision is:
(a) No person who has been found to have committed three or more inci-
dents of medical malpractice shall be licensed or continue to be licensed by
the State of Florida to provide health care services as a medical doctor.
(b) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following
meanings:
(1) The phrase "medical malpractice" means both the failure to prac-
tice medicine in Florida with that level of care, skill, and treatment rec-
ognized in general law related to health care providers' licensure, and
any similar wrongful act, neglect, or default in other states or countries
which, if committed in Florida, would have been considered medical
malpractice.
(2) The phrase "found to have committed" means that the malpractice
has been found in a final judgment of a court or law, final administra-
tive agency decision, or decision of binding arbitration
84 By the day after the election, the head of the FMA, referring to both
Amendments Seven and Eight, indicated that the organization "would be working to
persuade [the Florida legislature] of an interpretation that limits the amendments'
negative impact on doctors." Florida Doctors, Lawyers at Odds over Effects of Mal-
practice Amendments, Insurance Journal (Nov. 5, 2004), at
http://www.insurancejoumal.comlnews/southeast/2004/11/05/47480.htm (last ac-
cessed 4/19/07).
85 Gregory A. Chaires, Amendment 8: Its Impact Still Unknown, 3 RISK Rx 1
(2004), available at www.ufhscj.edu/resnet/risk-rx.newsletter_7_06.pdf. The bill that
passed was the senate substitute, Florida Senate Bill 940, for Florida House Bill 1739.
See 2005 Fla. Laws. ch. 266. There were only three dissenting votes in the senate and
none in the house. See Legislative History available at
httpJI/www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?Billld=16097&.
Although the bill also amended a few existing statutes, the heart of the change was in
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of limits were included on what could count as a strike for purposes of
Art X, Section 26. First, the act of alleged malpractice must have
occurred after Nov. 2 2004.86 Second, no matter how many claims
were brought, one act, or series of related acts, could never count for
more than one strike.87 Third, and most important, the legislature de-
termined that Amendment Eight was not meant to change the constitu-
tional right of doctors to be sanctioned by the State only under a clear
and convincing evidence standard.88 Thus, if there were a finding by a
court or arbitration panel based on a lesser standard, such as the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard that applies in malpractice ac-
tions, that in itself could not constitute a strike. Instead, the transcripts
of such a trial or hearing were to be provided by the physician to the
Board of Medicine. Only if the Board concluded that the evidence
clearly and convincingly demonstrated malpractice would there be a
strike. 89 As a result of the new law, it will be a long time, if ever, be-
fore any physician will have his license revoked based on the applica-
tion of the statute.90
new section 456.50. See 2005 Fla. Laws ch. 266.
86 FLA.STAT. ANN. § 456.50(1)(h) (West 2007).
87 § 456.50 (1)(d) (defining "incident").
88 See Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1987) ("the revocation
of a professional license is of sufficient gravity and magnitude to warrant a standard
of proof greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence; [the] correct standard for
the revocation of [a] professional license such as that of a lawyer, real estate broker,
or, as in this instance, a teacher, is that [the] evidence must be clear and convincing..
• ."). While the brief Turlington opinion does not cite to any particular provision of
either the federal or Florida constitution, the Florida Supreme Court has construed it
as interpreting the Florida Constitution. See Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. re
Pub. Prot. from Repeated Med. Malpractice, 880 So. 2d 667, 670-71 (Fla. 2004)
(refusing to strike Amendment Eight because it might interact with another part of the
constitution). It is unclear if the Court would agree that the new provision was not
meant to change that interpretation of the pre-amendment Florida constitution where
it applied. If this were a federal due process right, it would trump any contrary rule of
Article X, section 26. However, it is unclear that there is such a federal right. The
majority of states permit revocation based on the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. William P. Gunnar, The Scope of a Physician's Medical Practice: Is the Public
Adequately Protected by State Medical Licensure, Peer Review and the National
Practitioner Data Bank?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 329, 339 (2005).
89 See.§ 456.50(2). The relevant amended administrative rules went into
effect on January 3, 2007. E-mail from Ed Tellechea, Legal Counsel, Bd. of Med., to
Mary Coombs, Professor of Law, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law (Apr. 2, 2007, 10:31
EST) (on file with Health Matrix) (the Board itself reviews the transcripts in cases
that arise under this provision. As of the date of the e-mail, only one case had come
before the board in which there was discipline constituting a strike. Id.
90 One could readily argue that the statute undermines rather than imple-
ments the constitutional provision, which refers to the consequences of being "found"
to have committed malpractice in a "final judgment of a court of law," a finding
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E. Amendment Seven
The meaning of Amendment Seven, the "Patient's Right to
Know" proposal, which became Article X, Section 25 of the Constitu-
tion, was very much in contention until the recent Florida Supreme
Court decision in Florida Hospital Wateman v Buster,91 and is still not
entirely clear. The language is very broad: it gives patients a right to
any records made or received in the course of business by a health
care facility, or provider, relating to any adverse medical incident.92 It
would seem to allow potential patients, by checking these records, to
make more informed judgments when considering whether to use
physician A or B, or to have an elective procedure in hospital C or D,
which has no direct legal effect under the statute. However, it is hard to conceive who
could have standing to challenge the statute as unconstitutional. Physicians, who are
most directly affected, are benefited. I raised this question with my interviewees and
none provided a satisfactory scenario. The AFTL staff suggested that a patient who
had won a malpractice judgment but then discovered that the Board of Medicine had
not used it as a "strike" to revoke the physician's license might feel aggrieved and
sue, but could not explain how the patient would have standing. They concluded that,
"[tihe bottom line is I agree with you, I don't think any of us are holding [our] breath
waiting for litigation to erupt over Amendment 8, but I think some day there will be
litigation over it." AFTL interview, supra note 32 (transcript at 13).
9' 984 So. 2d 478 (2008)
92 The full text is:
(a) In addition to any other similar rights provided herein or by general law, patients
have a right to have access to any records made or received in the course of business
by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident.
(b) In providing such access, the identity of patients involved in the incidents shall not
be disclosed, and any privacy restrictions imposed by federal law shall be maintained.
(c) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) The phrases "health care facility" and "health care provider" have the meaning
given in general law related to a patient's rights and responsibilities.
(2) The term "patient" means an individual who has sought, is seeking, is undergoing,
or has undergone care or treatment in a health care facility or by a health care pro-
vider.
(3) The phrase "adverse medical incident" means medical negligence, intentional
misconduct, and any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility or health
care provider that caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient, includ-
ing, but not limited to, those incidents that are required by state or federal law to be
reported to any governmental agency or body, and incidents that are reported to or
reviewed by any health care facility peer review, risk management, quality assurance,
credentials, or similar committee, or any representative of any such committees.
(4) The phrase "have access to any records" means, in addition to any other procedure
for producing such records provided by general law, making the records available for
inspection and copying upon formal or informal request by the patient or a representa-
tive of the patient, provided that current records which have been made publicly
available by publication or on the Internet may be "provided" by reference to the
location at which the records are publicly available.
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and the amendment was largely described to the public as providing
exactly that.93 In fact, the provision has overwhelmingly been used in
the context of malpractice lawsuits or, rarely, investigative journal-
ism.94 Almost as soon as the election results were in, lawyers for the
Florida Hospital Association sought an injunction prohibiting en-
forcement of Amendment Seven.95 Meanwhile, trial lawyers with
pending malpractice cases cited Amendment Seven in requests for
various documents related to peer review of adverse incidents involv-
ing the defendants.96 The defendants resisted, and sought protective
orders, arguing that the amendment did not apply because it was not
retroactive or because it was not self-executing, or that it should be
construed so as not to abrogate existing statutes protecting peer review
from discovery and admissibility. The earliest reported court decisions
ruled for the physicians and hospitals.97
93 "[T]he 'Statement and Purpose' section of the amendment does not indi-
cate that furthering medical malpractice claims was a factor in its proposal. On the
contrary, the amendment indicates that it was primarily intended to reassert the 'Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights,' which the legislature had curtailed through a series of statutes
limiting the right of access to certain medical documents." Michota v. Bayfront Medi-
cal Center, Inc., 2005 WL 900771 Fla. Cir. Ct.).Trial lawyers still describe it in those
terms. See, e.g., Interview with Lincoln Connolly, supra note 78, (transcript at 5)
("patients should be able to have all the information available as to that doctor's
qualifications or competence before making that decision to go under anesthesia with
that doctor or go under knife with that doctor or trust that this doctor is the one who
going to be up to date on the latest treatments, prescriptions and what not for their
condition").
94 Steven Stark, head of the office of patient protection for the University of
Miami Medical Group, reports that there had been no requests that did not fall within
one of these categories. Private conversation in Miami, Fla. (March, 30 2007). Bill
Bell of the FHA said that "probably 99.9% of all requests we got on amendment
seven were trial lawyers who had active malpractice cases." Interview with Bill Bell,
supra note 40, (transcript at 9).
95 FHA v. Fla. Agency for Healthcare Admin. and Fla. Dep't of Health, Case
# 2004 -CA-002670 (2004). The Circuit court dismissed the case on the grounds that
there was no case in controversy. See Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact
Statement Regarding SB 938 [prepared by the Health Care Committee] at 3 (April 1
2005).
96 See, e.g. Richardson v. Nath, 2005 WL 408132 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) (sub-
poena seeking discovery under Amendment 7 filed on December 15 2004); Rusiecki
v. Jackson-Curtis, 2005 WL 408133 at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2005) (regarding a
letter request for adverse incident reports regarding physician-defendant sent to hospi-
tal on November 3, 2004).
97 See Bridgman v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., No. 51-04-CA-59-ES, 2005
WL 900630 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2005) (holding that Amendment Seven does not
conflict with the federal constitution or federal law, but is not self-executing);
Richardson v. Nash, 2005 WL 408132 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 18 2005)(amendment in-
tended to change existing law, but not self-executing, not retroactive); Rusiecki, 2005
WL 408133 at *7 (holding that the amendment is neither retroactive, nor self-
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Meanwhile, organizations of hospitals and physicians sought pro-
tection from the Florida legislature. 98 In the 2005 session, the legisla-
ture "implemented" Article X Section 26.99 The new statute narrowed
the potential scope of the constitutional provision in several ways. It
stated that the provision was not retroactive, meaning that it would
apply only to documents relating to adverse incidents which occurred
after passage of Amendment Seven.1t° Only final reports were cov-
ered; preliminary reports, materials considered by review committees,
and transcripts of the deliberations of such bodies thus remained sub-
ject to statutory protections of confidentiality and non-
discoverability.' 0 Patient-requesters were only entitled to records of
an incident involving the same condition, treatment or diagnosis as
their own. 102 Finally, the statute reiterated that any information a pa-
executing). Apparently only one judge found that the Amendment was both self-
executing and retroactive and thus issued an order requiring the production of the
documents requested. McHale v. Tenewitz, No. 052003CA054153, 2005 WL 900744,
at **4-5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 2005).
98 John Knight, What You Need to Know About Amendments 3, 7 and 8
(Florida Medical Association - Quarterly Journal January 2005) (on file with author);
Andi Atwater, Amendment 8 Will Hurt, Doctors Say, THE NEWS-PRESs (Fort Myers,
FL) (Nov. 14, 2004) IA; Interview with Rep. David Simmons in Orlando, Fla. (Dec.
14, 2006) (transcript at 2 on file with author); FMA interview, supra note 37, (tran-
script at 7-8).
99 Like the legislation on Amendment 8, the bill passed overwhelmingly,
with only two dissents in the senate and three in the house. One of the chief architects
in the Florida House referred to the project as finding "a solution to the problems that
were created by the passing of these constitutional amendments." Interview with
David Simmons, supra note 98, (transcript at 1).
The legislative history indicates that part of the impetus for the legislation was to
resolve the conflict in the decisions interpreting the amendment. Senate Staff Analysis
and Economic Impact Statement Regarding SB 938 at 3-4 (April 1 2005).
100 FLA. STAT. § 381.028(5) (2007) (announcing that the constitutional provi-
sion only applied to records created or incidents occurring after Nov. 2, 2004 and,
further, that at no time would a patient be entitled to records created more than four
years prior to the date of request).
'01 See § 381.028(3)0).
102 § 381.028(7)(a). Thus, for example, it would appear that a patient would
not be entitled to adverse incident reports regarding such general issues as infection
rate or medication errors, except insofar as the requester had already been the subject
of such an adverse incident. This provision also, in contrast to the amendment, seems
only to grant access to records of a "facility or provider of which he or she is a pa-
tient" (emphasis added). The Senate staff analysis concludes that "[tihese restrictions
would make it impossible for a person seeking treatment to obtain records of adverse
medical incidents as is provided in the constitution." Senate Staff Analysis and Eco-
nomic Impact Statement Regarding SB 938 at 14 (April 1 2005) (also raising consti-
tutional doubts about other aspects of the bill); see also Gary Blankenship, House
Works on Med Mal Amendment Implementation, FLA. B. NEws, Apr 1, 2005 at 20,
available at
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tient obtained under its terms was still subject to the very broad pro-
tections under existing Florida law against discovery or admissibility
at trial.
10 3
Litigation continued. Three cases that came down while the legis-
lation was under consideration took three different approaches. Mi-
chota v. Bayfront Medical Center held that Amendment Seven was
intended to provide access to documents that had been protected un-
der existing law. 1 4 It also concluded that the provision was self-
executing, but not retroactive, and therefore granted the plaintiff's
motion to compel only insofar as it sought documents created after
Nov. 2, 2004.105 McHale v. Tenewitz found that the provision was
both self-executing and retroactive, "as it relates to extant records,"
and denied the defendant's motion for a protective order.1°6 Brown v.
Graham held that Amendment Seven was not self-executing, and not
retroactive, and thus granted the motion for a protective order.' °7 It
also held that courts should read Amendment Seven narrowly, so as
not to interfere with the operation of existing laws that provide confi-
dentiality to various records, and the processes that created them, and
that protect them from discovery or admissibility; particularly in light
of the significant public policy behind these laws.108 In its discussion
of whether Amendment Seven was self-executing, the Brown court
noted that the Legislature was considering proposed legislation and
found it "significant that the broad outlines of the current proposal
mirror the conclusions reached in this order." 1°9
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOMIJN/JNNewsOl.nsf/Articles?OpenView&Start=8
6. l&Count=30&Expand=86#86 (then-Representative Jeff Kottkamp (now Lieutenant
Governor) is quoted as saying this provision was "limiting the constitution with a
statute and I'm not really convinced that is permissible.")
13 Fla. Stat. § 381.028(6).
'04 2005 WL 900771 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24 2005) at 4-5 (while rules regarding
admissibility of such documents remain in place, the broad right of access comprises
the right of access through discovery)
105 Id. at 6-11. Note that this is a more plaintiff-friendly interpretation of
"non-retroactivity" than in the statute, focusing on the date of the reports requested
rather than the date of the incident that was the subject of the report.
106 No. 052003CA054153, 2005 WL 900744 at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28
2005).
107 No. 501999CA007754, 2005 WL 900722, at *4-6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 18,
2005).
"'s Id. at *3-4.
'09 Id. at *5.
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After this legislation passed, 0 litigation also focused on the va-
lidity of the statute: did it correctly answer the question of retroactiv-
ity? Was it consistent with the Amendment, or was it an invalid at-
tempt by the Legislature to restrict constitutional rights? Again courts
took somewhat different positions on these issues. Notami Hospital of
Florida, Inc. v. Bowen held that the constitutional provision was self-
executing,"' and that the statute that purported to implement it instead
conflicted with it. 112 The court noted that the statute "drastically limits
discovery of records the amendment expressly states are discoverable,
and limits the 'patients' qualified to access those records," and was
thus unconstitutional.!1 3  Finally, the court ruled that Amendment
Seven was intended to be retrospective as to existing records. 11
4
Florida Hospital Watennan v. Buster15 agreed only in part with
the Notami court's analysis. The intermediate appellate court in Flor-
ida Waterman determined that the Amendment "preempts the statu-
tory privileges" of peer review insofar as it allows such records to be
discovered in litigation." 6 It then concluded that the newly enacted
statute wrongly narrowed the meaning of the amendment to make it as
consistent as possible with this prior statutory law, 17 finding support
for its conclusion in the Supreme Court's advisory opinion." 8 How-
10 The implementing legislation in regard to both Amendments Seven and
Eight was signed into law by the governor on June 20, 2005. Melissa Morgan Haw-
kins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update: Legislation Enabling the Patients' Right to Know
Act and Three Strikes Rule, TRIAL ADvOc. Q., Spring 2006, at 7.
" 927 So. 2d 139, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the provision
laid down a specific clear rule and did not require legislative action, and citing Gray
v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1960) for the rule that constitutional provisions are
presumed to be self-executing to avoid giving legislatures the power to effectively
nullify the will of the people), affd sub nom. Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster,
Nos. SC06-688, SC06-912, 2008 WL 596700 (Fla. Mar. 6, 2008). Later that year, the
4th District Court of Appeals, in North Broward Hospital District v. Kroll, 940 So. 2d
1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) followed Notami and rejected Florida Waterman.
112 Notami, 927 So. 2d at 142-43.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 144-45 (relying on the language allowing access to "any record
relating to any adverse incident" and extending the right to patients who had received
treatment prior to the date of enactment).
.5 932 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), affirmed in part and reversed in
part, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fl. 2008).
116 Id. at 350-52.As the court noted it would "make little sense" to allow a
patient access to information, but then deny that same access upon the filing of a
lawsuit and rejected the Hospital's view that prior legislative privileges should be
seen as unchanged by the passage of the amendment..
17 Id. at 353. The statute was also unnecessary, since the court found that the
amendment was self executing. Id. At 355.
118 Id at 353. The Court had said in passing that "the amendment would affect
[those] sections.. .of the Florida statutes which currently exempt the records of in-
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ever, Florida Waterman, in contrast to Notami, held that the Amend-
ment was not intended to be retroactive, 119 and that retroactive appli-
cation would be constitutionally impermissible.
120
The Florida Supreme Court granted review on May 5 2006. 121
There were three issues before it: whether Amendment Seven pre-
empts existing statutory privileges for peer review, whether it is self-
executing, and if it should be applied retroactively.1 22 The importance
of these issues to the trial bar and hospitals and physicians organiza-
tions was demonstrated in part by the number of amicus briefs.
1 23
The Florida Supreme Court's decision, issued on March 6,
2008,124 was an almost complete triumph for the plaintiffs. It first
concluded that the Amendment is self-executing. It provides a "suffi-
vestigations, proceedings, and records of the peer review panel from discovery...
Indeed, this is a primary purpose of the amendment." Advisory Opinion to the Att'y
Gen. re Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents, 880 So. 2d 617, 620-
21 (Fla. 2004).
"9 Id. at 354. It relied on the presumption that legislation is intended to oper-
ate prospectively. Nothing in the language rebutted that presumption and, it con-
cluded, the existence of an effective date confirmed it.
120 Id. Focusing on the information health care professionals provided during
the peer review process, it found that they had a vested right in its confidentiality.
121 Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 926 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 2006). Appar-
ently, the opinion from the Fifth District Court of Appeals was not published until
two months after it had been issued and the Supreme Court had accepted the hospi-
tal's petition for review. It later granted certiorari in Notami Hospital and Kroll as
well.. See Wellner v. E. Pasco Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 2D05-2079, 2007 WL 866003, at
*2 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. Mar. 23, 2007) at 2. The briefs all refer to Florida Waterman.
See, e.g., id. Apparently Kroll settled, since the Supreme Court opinion refers only to
Florida Waterman and Notami Hospital. Florida Hospital Waterman, v Buster, 984
So. 2d 478, 478 (Fl. 2008)
122 Id. at 356. Interestingly, while all the other briefs filed with the Supreme
Court respond directly to one or more of these questions, the amicus brief of the Flor-
ida Patient Safety Corporation focuses instead on trying to ensure that Amendment
Seven be read in light of several federal statutes protecting patient privacy and patient
safety processes. Proposed Amicus Curiae Brief of Florida Patient Safety Corpora-
tion, Inc. On Behalf of All Patients in Florida in the Interest of Patient Safety, Florida
Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, No. SC06-688 (July 5, 2006), 2006 WL 2302682.
123 Amicus briefs were filed by the Florida Hospital Association, the Florida
Defense Lawyers Association, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, and Floridians
for Patient Protection. See Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc., v. Buster, Nos. SC06-688,
SC06-912, 2008 WL 596700 (Fla. Mar. 6, 2008), for downloadable versions of most
amicus briefs (follow "Briefs and Other Related Documents" hyperlink). The posi-
tion of the trial lawyers is that the Amendment did not require any implementing
legislation and that "the legislation that did pass is unconstitutional, because it is
inconsistent on its face with the Amendment. It unimplements it." AFTL interview,
supra note 32, (transcript at 14).
124 Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d. 478 (Fla. 2008).
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cient rule" for courts to follow.' 2 Furthermore, it held, the amend-
ment's "language makes evident that it was intended to effect an im-
mediate change in the law governing access to medical records with-
out the need for legislative action,"126 and that a contrary decision
could frustrate the will of the people.1
27
The Court then examined the question of whether the Amendment
authorized access to records in existence on the date it took effect and
whether it could validly do so.128 It stressed that "the amendment was
intended to provide immediate access to existing records."'129 It then
held that the statutory provisions protecting these records did not cre-
ate a substantive, vested right.130
Finally, the Court found that numerous provisions of the statute
conflicted with the Amendment and were thus invalid. 3 ' While the
Court did not invalidate the entire statute, the portions left standing
were of far less substantive significance.
32
If the Florida Supreme Court had concurred with the arguments of
the defendants, then Amendment Seven would have changed little in
Florida law. However, the justices construed the constitutional provi-
sion broadly and found key provisions of the statute unconstitutional.
This suggests that reports of the results of most peer review activities -
- reports that had once been kept confidential -- will now apparently
be open to public view.133
125 984 So. 2d at 485, quoting Gray v Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960).
As it noted later, the legislature was free to act, as long as the purpose of any statute
was "to1gve force and effect to [the Amendment's] provisions." Id. At 492
6 984 So. 2d at 486.
127 [bid., citing Gray v Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960)
128 984 So. 2d. at 486-87.
129 984 So. 2d at 487.
'30 984 So. 2d at 490-92. The court noted that the precise content of these
privileges had changed over time and was never absolute. "[A]t most, medical pro-
viders received an expectancy that legislative policy favored only limited access and
use of [certain] records." Id. At 491. Justice Lewis dissented from this portion of the
majority opinion. 984 So. 2d at 494
11 984 So. 2d at 493-94 (finding unconstitutional provisions limiting discov-
ery a) to final reports, b) to reports dealing with a same or similar condition as suf-
fered by requesting patients, c) to records of a facility or provider of which requestors
are patients and d) to records generated after November 2, 2004, and indicating that
e) existing privilege statutes are unchanged, and f) existing laws regarding discover-
ability and admissibility into evidence of records are unchanged.
132 984 So. 2d at 493 (finding unproblematic the definitional section, and
provisions identifying who is responsible for identifying relevant medical records and
limiting the allowable fees for production of such records.
133 While the provision refers only to patients' right to know, if that is read
broadly it would not be difficult for the media to find an appropriate requester and
then publicize the peer review materials that were obtained and shared with them.
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F. The Current Florida Malpractice Landscape
In total, it is unlikely that much direct benefit or harm will come
from Amendments' Three or Eight. There is almost certainly no risk to
a physician's licehsure status from losing a malpractice case. There is
little necessary change, and probably no more than a modest change in
fact, in the contingency fees lawyers can collect. The impact of
Amendment Seven, given the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, may be
significant but it is too early to assess. In the interim, there has been
little legislative focus on issues relevant to malpractice. The most sig-
nificant change was the elimination of joint liability in all uninten-
tional tort cases in 2006, a reform that all the business interests, in-
cluding the health care industry, made their top legislative priority. 134
As the former Executive Director for the 2003 Governor's Task Force
on malpractice issues put it,
What a waste of the [Florida Medical] association's money,
dues, for 3 which is now essentially mummified, 7 which I
believe will lead to poor patient care and will be mummified,
8 [which] will never have a practical effect. . Just a terrible,
horrific waste of resources.
35
One reason for this lack of focused attention to malpractice re-
cently may be that malpractice claims experience substantially im-
proved since 2004 from the perspective of health care practitioners,
hospitals and their insurers.1 36 The number of claims has fallen.137 The
Note however, that federal law may provide substantial protections for peer review,
regardless of the outcome of Florida Waterman. See text at note 207,
'34 FLA. ST. ANN. § 768.81 (West 2006). There is an odd link between this bill
and the initiative story. According to one source, the defeat of the trial lawyers at the
polls persuaded the business community to think that they could also be defeated in
the legislature and encouraged proponents to focus on this bill despite knowing that
the trial lawyers would be working to defeat it. Interview with Mark Delegal, supra
note 39, (transcript at 5).
135 Interview with William Large, supra note 30, (transcript at 8); see also
Interview with Robert Wychulis, CEO of Florida Association of Health Plans, Talla-
hassee, Fla. (Dec. 5, 2006) (transcript at 8) ("I don't believe any of those constitu-
tional amendments were implemented in a way in which they were intended by the
parties").
136 See Brian Bandell, Study: Hospital Malpractice Losses Down 10%, S. FLA
Bus. J., Oct. 25 2006,
http://southflorida.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2006/10/23/dailyl5.htm
(discussing report from Aon Consulting that shows the number of claims against
hospitals fell 26% over the course of five years).
137 The number of claims against hospitals fell 26% over five years. Id.
"Newly reported claims and incidents were down 29% for 2004" at FPIC. quoted by
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frequency of claims per physician has fallen. 138 The severity of claim
per physician has fallen, or been flat. 39 According to a report from the
Commissioner of the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, t4° in-
curred losses and the pure loss ratio dropped steeply from 2002-
2005,141 while the number of practitioners who were forced into the
joint underwriting residual market declined as eighteen new compa-
nies entered the market. 42 As a result, malpractice insurance rates are
declining or flattening. While malpractice insurance rates around the
country also declined during this period, 143 the rates in Florida de-
clined less than the Florida Insurance Consumer Advocate suggested
was appropriate given the declines in insurance companies' loss ra-
tios.1 44 While there is no consensus, and no reliable research- based
the Florida Justice Association, 2007 Medical Malpractice Fact Sheet 6 along with
other, similar quotes. Florida Justice Association, 2007 Medical Malpractice Fact
Sheet (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Health Matrix: Journal of Law-
Medicine).
138 The number of claims per physician declined from 13.6% in 2001 to
10.7% in 2005. Bandell, supra note 136.
139 Severity of a claim per physician was $135,000 in 2003, whereas in 2004
and 2005 it was $108,000. Id. The numbers are different, but the pattern is similar in
the National Practitioner Data Bank. It shows a median payment on a medical mal-
practice claim of $175,000 in 2005 which ranked it 2 3rd among all states; this was a
significant improvement from the cumulative data, which showed a median of
$150,000, ranking Florida 6' among all states. U.S. DEFr. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERvIcES, HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMIN., NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TABLE 13 AT 70.
140 The 2007 report is available at
http://www.floir.com/DataReports/DataReports.htm#Pro%20and%2OCas%20-
%20Reports
41 Id. at Figures at pp. 4 & 6. Each flattened during 2006.
142 Id. at 3.
143 Rate filings for physician and surgeon malpractice insurance shows a
decline in the percentage increase from 2003 (19.6% approved rate increase) to 2004
(9.2% approved rate increase) to 2005 (7.0% approved rate increase). FLA. OFFICE OF
INS. REGULATION, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE FINANCIAL
INFORMATION CLOSED CLAIM DATABASE AND RATE FILINGS 35 (2006), available at
http://www.floir.com/pdf/2006Medicahmalpracticereport.pdf [hereinafter 2006
ANNUAL REPORT); FLA. OFFICE OF INS. REGULATION, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT: MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE FINANCIAL INFORMATION CLOSED CLAIM DATABASE AND RATE FILINGS
37 (2005), available at http://www.floir.com/pdf/med-mal%20report%202005.pdf
[hereinafter 2005 ANNUAL REPORT]; see also the quotes from Crittenden's Medical
Insurance News indicating such changes in premiums more generally, quoted by the
Florida Justice Association, 2007 Medical Malpractice Fact Sheet 3-4 Florida Justice
Association, 2007 Medical Malpractice Fact Sheet (2007) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine).
144 See FLA. OFFICE OF INS. REGULATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES IN
FLORIDA 5 (April 2007), available at http://www.floir.com/pdf/Med-
MalPFRptO4l32007.pdf
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evidence explaining this change, 45 the change itself erodes pressure
to deal with malpractice. As others have noticed, reform efforts,
whether the policies they seek are good or bad, are most intense when
there is a perceived malpractice crisis. Similarly, reform efforts, and
focus on malpractice, is cyclical. Florida, having devoted significant
time and political effort to passing a bill in 2003, is probably unready
seriously to revisit the issue until those reforms prove inadequate in
the eyes of at least some major stakeholders. 46
II. THE IMPACT OF FLORIDA'S INITIATIVES
The effects of the malpractice amendments and of the process
leading up to them on the legal landscape, and the political will neces-
sary to engage these issues is a complex question, one beyond the
scope of this story. However, it is worth considering the particular
measures as voters passed them, as examples of malpractice reforms.
This story might help us think about how - or more precisely how not
-- to do malpractice reform.
What counts as "good reform" is an enormous and enormously
controversial task., One could, I suspect, exceed the page count im-
posed by most lav,' reviews with nothing but a single footnote citing
the literature on tis question. To say that we cannot agree on the
"good" does not mean, however, that we cannot agree on what consti-
tutes the "bad." As I hope to demonstrate below, each of these re-
forms, as adopted, was likely to make matters worse for patients, the
ultimate touchstone for malpractice and for health care reform gener-
ally.
145 As noted earlier, leaders of the malpractice insurance industry and the
FMA attribute this to Amendment Three; trial lawyers to legislative reforms in 2003
and earlier. The timing seems inconsistent with an explanation based on an amend-
ment that would not have taken effect until November 2004 and then only as to cases
not yet accepted by the plaintiffs' attorneys. One malpractice plaintiff's attorney said
that 'it is too early for the tort reform laws to affect the number and severity of
claims." Bandell, supra note 136. The Insurance Commissioner's Report references
both the legislative reform and the constitutional amendments without attempting to
parse out chains of causality. See 2006 ANN AL REPORT, supra note 143. Arguably,
Florida's malpractice insurance rates simply mirror a national trend. See id. at 1
(stating that the fifteen insurance firms comprising 80% of Florida's medical malprac-
tice market also experienced comparable loss and expense ratios in other major mar-
kets across the country).
146 However, if scholars are correct that a key indicator of increasing malprac-
tice rates is the insurance cycle, driven by declines in market returns, another mal-
practice crisis may be looming. See, e.g., Paul C. Weiler, Reforming Medical Mal-
practice in a Radically Moderate - and Ethical Fashion, 54 DePaul Law Rev. 205,
209-11)(2005).
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Each of the reforms seems to suffer from the problems one would
expect given their origins. Amendment Three was modeled on caps on
attorney fees that were part of the law elsewhere, beginning with Cali-
fornia's MICRA in 1975.147 By 2006, a substantial minority of states
had adopted such caps.1 48 No other state except Delaware,149 however,
had set the cap as low as that in Amendment Three.
150
Some scholars have argued that the United States system of con-
tingency fees is itself the source of bad public policy, encouraging
unethical behavior by lawyers, and a litigation explosion.1 51 There has
147 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (1975). The Medical Injury Compen-
sation Reform Act of 1975 was the first comprehensive malpractice reform statute,
where reform means changes designed to reduce the frequency and size of malprac-
tice judgments leading to lower malpractice premiums and thus increased availabil-
ity/affordability of health care services. It was enacted during the first malpractice
crisis in the mid-1970s, when California doctors went on strike to protest the situa-
tion. NICHOLAS M. PACE, DANIELA GOLINELLI & LAURA ZAKARAS, CAPPING NON-
ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS
UNDER MICRA 4-6 (2004). In addition to the limit on attorney contingency fees, it
includes a $50,000 cap on non-economic damages; allows the introduction of evi-
dence of collateral source payments; requires claimants to give a 90-day notice of
intent to sue; shortens the statute of limitations to three years from the injury or one
year from when the injury was or should have been discovered; allows defendants to
choose to pay the future damages portion of a judgment in periodic payments and
permits binding arbitration clauses in contracts between patients and health care pro-
viders. See Californians Allied for Patient Protection, Provisions of MICRA,
http://www.micra.org/about-micra/micra-provisions.htm
148 See Dwyer, supra note 68, at 615-17& nn. 20-25 (asserting that there are
twenty-four states with some form of statutory or regulatory contingency cap, a num-
ber he reaches by including both statutory caps and those in the form of ethics rules,
both malpractice specific caps and caps for all personal injury actions, caps that set
out numerical limits and those that require court review in all cases, or at the request
of a party, or in the case of a dispute). Dwyer even includes Oregon, which applies its
cap only to punitive damages in medical malpractice cases, and Indiana, which ap-
plies only when the state's patient's compensation fund represents the defendant. Id.
at 616 n.22.
149 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.18 § 6865 (1999) (limiting attorneys' fees to 35%
of the first $100,000, 25% of the next $100,000, and 10% of all amounts over
$200,000).
1SO Consider the different outcomes under the Florida and California provi-
sions at three levels of recovery.
Total Recovery $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 $3,000,000
Att, Fee: Calif $74, 200 $136,700 $221,700 $521,700
Atty Fee: Florida $75,000 $100,000 $150,000 $450,000
151 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Procedural Tort Reform: Lessons from
Other Nations 19 REGULATION: THE CATO REV. OF BUS. & GOv'T 71, 79-81 (1996),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl9nle.htmi; Walter Olson, Sue
City: The Case Against the Contingency Fee, POL'Y REv. Winter 1991, at 47, 50.
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also been heated debate over whether contingency fees are exces-
sive. 12
The move to cap attorney contingency fees in malpractice cases
evokes many of the same arguments. The proponents of fee caps, in
Florida as elsewhere, indicated that their goal was to reduce the num-
ber of claims, particularly "frivolous" claims153 and thus the financial
impact on physicians.154 One can certainly argue that reducing the
152 The argument has been made that lawyers on contingency fees, because of
market imperfections, obtain excessively high fees, harming their clients and those
whom they sue. The primary proponent of this view is Lester Brickman. See gener-
ally Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It
Price Competitive? 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65 (2003). Herbert M. Kritzer has claimed,
to the contrary, that the data show that contingency fee lawyers receive incomes con-
sistent with what one would expect in a reasonably well-functioning market. See,
e..g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998). Meanwhile, Alexander Tabarrok and Eric
Helland have made theoretical arguments supporting the Kritzer position that contin-
gency fees ought not to be regulated from the perspective of free-market economists
who assume that, if contingency fee lawyers were earning high rates of return, not
justified by special expertise, other lawyers would begin to compete with them, since
barriers to entry within the legal profession are low. See, e.g., Alexander Tabarrok
and Eric Helland, Two Cheers for Contingent Fees (AEI Press 2005). Note, however,
that trial lawyers themselves describe the malpractice bar as a "specialty bar" "be-
cause of the complexity of the cases and the cost," AFTL interview, supra note 32,
(transcript at 10, 12).
Patricia Danzon produced two earlier, less ideologically charged, data-
driven studies of the impact of contingency fees, specifically in the context of medical
malpractice. Unfortunately, the inferences from the results of the two studies are
somewhat inconsistent. PATRICIA M. DANZON, NEW EVIDENCE ON THE FREQUENCY
AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (Rand Corporation 1986); Patricia
M. Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEG. STUDIES 345 (1983).
153 See, e.g., Comments of American Medical Ass'n & Mississippi State
Medical Ass'n in Support of Petition at 6, In re Amendment to the Rules Regulating
the Fla. Bar-Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B) of the Rules of Prof I Conduct, 939 So. 2d 1032 (Fla.
2006) (No. SC05-1150) (asserting that Amendment Three "simply compels attorneys
to absorb more of the risks involved with filing non-meritorious lawsuits"). Hereinaf-
ter I use the term "weak" rather than 'frivolous." That a claim is ultimately withdrawn
does not mean it was frivolous when filed, particularly where a lawsuit may be a
necessary means to determine what went wrong, and such discovery may demonstrate
that there was not actionable malpractice. See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MYTH 83-85 (2005).
154 Some proponents of limiting fees also suggest that this would lead plain-
tiffs to settle cases sooner, since the attorney's incentive to maintain the case in hopes
of a substantially larger fee is less when his percentage of the recovery declines with
the size of the recovery, as under the most common form of fee limitation. Cf. Olson,
supra note 151, at 49 (arguing that even where clients might tire of the fight and want
to settle, the "lawyer with a big war chest has an incentive to make you wait in order
to go for the extra money"). Yet David Bernstein, a harsh critic of contingency fees,
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volume of claims, and thus lowering malpractice insurance rates, re-
dounds to the benefit of patients by increasing the availability and
reducing the costs of medical care. The argument is much stronger,
however, if the proposed reform screens out weak claims, 155 rather
than a more random subset of existing claims, both weak and clearly
valid ones.
156
One study that focused specifically on contingent fees in malprac-
tice cases was triggered by Amendment Three itself. After the initia-
tive had received sufficient signatures to be placed on the ballot, but
before the 2004 election, the Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section
of the ABA commissioned a report. 157 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
report concluded that caps on contingency fees were unwarranted,
158
though it did suggest some procedural reforms to empower clients to
negotiate with attorneys over fee arrangements. 159 One point it rather
gleefully made, repeated to me by leaders of the AFTPL,' 6° is that wit-
nesses before the Florida legislature who had claimed that frivolous
lawsuits drove the need for reform were unable to "cite a single ex-
ample of a frivolous lawsuit" when put under oath.
161
claims that they will lead the lawyer to settle too quickly, so he need not spend any
more hours on the case. Bernstein, supra note 151, at 79. A Rand study of MICRA,
which includes attorney fee caps as well as non-economic damages caps, concluded
that the damage caps saved defendants $125.1 million out of the $420.6 million they
would have paid without MICRA; because of the fee cap, plaintiffs absorbed $40.9
million of this and plaintiff's attorneys absorbed the other $84 million. The study
notes that this may make attorneys even more selective in accepting only cases with a
good chance of receiving a high value economic damages award. PACE, et al., supra
note 147.
155 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 766.201-766.206 (requirement that the plaintiff do
an investigation including the obligation to provide an expert affidavit indicating that
there was malpractice before suit may be filed).
156 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b) (West 2002) (providing a two year
statute of limitations and, in effect, a four year statute of repose except for claims by
minors for medical malpractice actions).
157 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TORT TRIAL & INSURANCE PRACTICE
SECTION, REPORT ON CONTINGENT FEES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
(2004).
158 Id. at 37-42. Though many of the members of the task force were not
plaintiff's attorneys, all were attorneys. Id. (unpaginated list of Task Force members).
All the witnesses were attorneys, although they did include two academics, William
Sage and David Hyman who have both J.D. and M.D. degrees. Id. at 13-14 The Flor-
ida Medical Association, though invited to speak, declined. Id. at 39 and n. 108.
159 Id. at 43-45.
160 AFTL interview, supra note 32, (transcript at 3).
161 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TORT TRIAL & INSURANCE PRACTICE
SECTION, supra note 157, at 21. Bob White, the head of FPIC, testified that Florida
"fixed its frivolous lawsuit problem in 1988." Hearing on Medical Malpractice before
the Senate Committee on Judiciary 56 (Fla. 2003) [hereinafter Medical Malpractice
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Critics of the current contingency fee system seem to assume that
plaintiffs' lawyers play a lottery:, they bring large numbers of cases,
without concern for their validity. The high profits from the few that
succeed more than cover the costs to the lawyers of the cases that
fail.' 62 Meanwhile, large numbers of innocent people must suffer the
financial and psychological costs of defending themselves in lawsuits.
This theory, even assuming it were valid for some cases, such as auto
accident claims, 163 seems particularly inapt for medical malpractice.
Other reforms, such as various forms of pre-suit notice or mandatory
mediation, are specifically designed to filter out weak claims at an
early stage. Furthermore, each malpractice case is costly because it
requires extensive attorney time and hiring experts, both to evaluate
the case and to prepare for trial. 64 Assuming the plaintiffs attorney
can make a reasonable prediction of the strength of a case, she is
unlikely to take a weak one.1 65 The fact that the attorney may be
wealthy because of success in other cases should make her less will-
ing, not more, to invest her time in weak cases.
Medical malpractice cases are also unusual in the extent to which
the contingency fee represents a risk premium. Critics of malpractice
litigation argue that because such a high percentage of the cases are
dropped or dismissed, and the plaintiffs success rate at trial is low,
many of the cases brought must be frivolous. Whether or not this
shows that the case should never have been brought, it suggests that
the malpractice attorney's hourly-equivalent income will be lower, all
else being equal, than that of a lawyer bringing other kinds of per-
sonal injury cases.166
Hearing] (on file with author).
162 Bernstein, supra note 151, at 10, citing Walter Olson.
163 This kind of practice is more likely to be a volume operation, in which a
lawyer has numerous outstanding cases, of which he can expect a fair number to settle
before he must invest substantial resources in them, and in which the occasional high
damages, high fee case helps finance the rest of the practice.
164 "It can take tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars - and sometimes more
- to prepare a complex medical malpractice action," Gary Blankenship, Dueling
Amendments Pass, FLORIDA BAR NEws, Nov. 15, 2004
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summarv 0199-3445913 ITM (quoting Florida Bar
President Kelly Overstreet Johnson). If the case is dropped without an indemnity
payment or lost at trial, as a practical matter the plaintiff's attorney must absorb all
these costs.
165 One attorney estimated that at his firm, "we probably don't take 90%-95%
of the malpractice cases that come through our door." Interview with Lincoln Con-
nolly, supra note 78, (transcript at 10).
166 Brickman's argument that contingency fees are too high because lawyers
prevail in 70-90% of their cases is likely a false generalization. Contra Brickman,
supra note 152, at 80. The argument is wildly false if applied to malpractice litigation.
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A contingency fee cap will deter attorneys from taking some cases
that they otherwise would have brought. To some extent these will be
weaker cases; a case in which liability appears clear, and thus easy to
prove, can still be worth taking even with relatively modest dam-
ages. 16 But the cap will also deter attorneys from taking cases without
enough damages. Even without state-imposed caps on contingent fees,
a very large percentage of instances of actual malpractice never lead
to a lawsuit.1 68 Many of these are situations where the harm to the
plaintiff is insufficient to be worth the attorney's time, even where
liability could be proven relatively easily. 169 As suggested in the table
in footnote 150, a cap will, definitionally, raise the floor of predicted
recovery necessary for a rational attorney to be willing to take the
case.
Thus the cap, even if it reduced the number of cases brought - and
assuming that this was itself a social good - is a poorly designed re-
form from the perspective of its proponents. 170 Cases with predicted
multimillion dollar judgments will still attract plaintiffs' attorneys.
Yet it is those cases, in which the carrier is at risk of very high poten-
tial damages, that are particularly problematic for the insurance com-
panies, and thus have a disproportionate impact on insurance rates.
171
Contingency fee caps are an inefficient way of reducing the extent of
frivolous claims, and the more stringent the cap, the more harm it does
in limiting valid claims relative to the benefit of deterring frivolous
ones.
167 One plaintiffs' attorney told me that in such cases, which are likely candi-
dates for quick settlement, he does not even bother to ask his clients waive the fee
limits imposed by Amendment Three. Conversation with Scott McMillen, supra note
81.
168 PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991).
169 The low damages may be because there was little harm in the sense that
the plaintiff's harm was temporary. It may also be a situation of long-term harm to
someone whose recoverable damages are low because the plaintiff is retired, with no
lost income, and where medical expenses are modest or covered by third parties in a
state that has abrogated the collateral source rule.
170 It can only serve their purposes if it drives lawyers away from the malprac-
tice field altogether, because there are not enough cases with enough potential profit
for a rational attorney to take the time to develop the expertise to do a good job. Ei-
ther no malpractice cases will be brought, or they will be brought by personal injury
generalists who will make fatal errors trying to navigate the particular minefields of
malpractice law or will quickly settle even the most meritorious claims so as not to
risk doing so.
171 Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle,
54 DEPAuL L. REv. 393, 422-26 (2005) (describing the impact on the swings between
hard and soft markets in the malpractice insurance of volatility, long tails and risks of
large and hard-to-predict damages in claims not yet brought).
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Similarly, Amendment Eight is -- at best -- an ill-designed re-
sponse to a real problem. The arguments in its favor assumed that
there was a core of particularly bad doctors who caused significant
harm to their patients and that the Florida Board of Medicine was un-
willing or unable to provide adequate discipline. 172 It is difficult to
know how effective Florida's Board of Medicine is, either absolutely
or in comparison to other states, at the task of discovering which doc-
tors fail to do their work properly and then imposing appropriate sanc-
tions . The Board of Medicine reported that there were 276 discipli-
nary proceedings in the 2005-06 fiscal year. 174 The Federation of State
Medical Boards Annual Report for 2005 showed that there were 872
prejudicial actions in Florida, against 815 physicians. 175 Public Citi-
zen showed that there were 182 serious Board actions during 2005
172 See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, FLORIDA'S REAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PROBLEM: BAD DOCTORS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES, NOT THE LEGAL SYSTEM 4
(2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FLAreport.pdf [hereinafter
PUBLIC CrrlzEN, BAD DOCTORS]. In a more recent report, Public Citizen shows Florida
as ranking number thirty-two in number of serious disciplinary actions per 1,000
physicians from 2003 to 2005. Public Citizen, Ranking of State Medical Board Seri-
ous Disciplinary Actions: 2003-2005, tbl.1, (2006),
http://www.citizen.org/publicationslprintrelease.cfm?ID=7428 [hereinafter PUBLIC
CrzEN, RANKING].
173 The three public data sources are non-comparable. The annual report of
the Board of Medicine Prosecution Services Unit is based on a fiscal year, deals only
with disciplinary actions (instead of determinations not to issue a Florida license), and
does not include citations, which are typically based on failure to document continu-
ing education credits and are considered penalties rather than disciplinary actions
(unless the behavior is repeated). See e-mail from Larry McPherson, Executive Dir.,
Fla. Bd. of Med., to Mary Coombs, Professor of Law, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law
(Apr. 17, 2007, 10:24 EST) (on file with Health Matrix). It does, however, provide
detail regarding the kinds of discipline and the types of violations. Id. The Annual
Report of the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) is presented as calendar
year data, includes actions taken through both the licensure and disciplinary process,
and includes citations. Id Florida's Board will no longer forward non-disciplinary
citations to the FSMB as of next year. Id. As a result, it will appear that Florida is
disciplining fewer physicians. See id. Finally, Public Citizen includes only the more
severe forms of discipline, so that their data will indicate fewer physicians are being
disciplined than the FSMB data across all states. Id.
174 PROSECUTION SERVICES UNIT, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, SUMMARY OF
PROSECUTION AND DISCIPLINARY AcTIvrry FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005-6 9 (2005) (on file
with author). These totals had ranged in the five prior years from 200 to 279. Id.
175 FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., TRENDS IN PHYSICIAN REGULATION 22 (2006),
available at
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/PUBFSMBTrends-inPhysician-Regulation_2006.pdf..
A seeming large increase in the number of actions between 2003 and 2004 may be an
artifact of a recent law affecting continuing medical education (CME) requirements
for initial licensure and a corresponding bump in citations. See id. (illustrating the
increase in board actions against physicians).
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and calculated that the number of serious actions per 1000 physicians
ranked Florida 3 2nd in the nation.
176
In some sense, even this data might be viewed as overstating the
extent to which "dangerous doctors" are disciplined. In Florida, as in
most states, there are many grounds for discipline that are related tan-
gentially, if at all, to incompetence. 77 Meanwhile, the Board had the
authority to consider malpractice judgments as part of its assessment
of whether discipline was appropriate even prior to the changes
wrought by Amendment Eight. Under Florida law, physicians must
176 PUBLIC CrrzEN RANKINGS, supra note 172. Another difficulty with recon-
ciling the sources is their variant data regarding the denominator. For example, the
Public Citizen study shows 51,025 Florida physicians in 2004, id., while the FSMB
Report shows 49,448 licensed physicians, with 38,216 practicing in-state for the same
year, and each of these numbers increasing by about 3,000 by 2005. FED'N OF STATE
MED. BDS., supra note 175. The Board of Medicine report does not include this data,
BOARD OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 174, but the Annual Report of the Florida
Department of Health Division of Medical Quality Assurance for 2005-06 shows
39,016 medical doctors, in addition to a few hundred in specialty categories that in-
clude limited license and critical need area. 2005-2006 FL. DEP'T OF HEALTH DIV. OF
MED. QUALrrY ASSURANCE ANN. REP. 27. The difference between the two latter num-
bers may simply be an artifact of using calendar year rather than fiscal year data. The
Public Citizen data must include physicians with Florida licenses but not practicing
in-state.
While the number of disciplinary actions is modest, it has increased over time. In
1963-67 only 938 disciplinary actions were taken nationwide. ROBERT C.
DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES 77 (1969)).
177 The lengthy list of sanctionable behaviors is set out in FLA. STAT. §
456.079 (2007) and in the Discipline and Licensure Restrictions of the Florida Ad-
ministrative Code, FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64B8-8.001 (1986 & Supp. 2007). The
Board of Medicine Report indicated that 156 of the disciplinary violations in 2005-06
were for patient care issues. BOARD OF MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 174. One study
showed that only a modest portion of sanctions nationwide were based on the codes
most clearly linked to malpractice; a substantial portion were based on other, ill-
defined codes that might well also suggest harm or risk of future harm to patient care.
Darren Grant & Kelly Alfred, Sanctions and Recidivism: An Evaluation of Physician
Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 J. Health Politics, Pol'y & L. 867,875-76 &
tbl. 2(2007) (18.8% of the sanctions reported by the Public Citizen were for "substan-
dard care, incompetence, [and] negligence;" and 12.2% reported by the Federation of
State Medical Boards were for "failure to conform to minimal standards of acceptable
medical practice"). In the past, the focus of discipline was even more clearly on ac-
tions not directly related to competence, but easier to prove: writing inappropriate
prescriptions, generally involving narcotics, and self-abuse with alcohol or drugs. See
OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MED. LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OvERviEw 13
(1986); DERBYSHIRE, supra note 176 at 78 (listing the common causes for medical
disciplinary actions in Table 5). Indeed, incompetence was not even included as a
ground for discipline until 1965 and in the late '70s roughly half the states still did not
include it. FRANK P. GRAD & NOELIA MARTI, PHYSICIANS' LICENSURE & DISCIPLINE:
THE LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 125 (1979).
HOW NOT TO DO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
forward information on closed malpractice claims to the Office of
Insurance Regulation, which then informs the Department of
Health.178 In turn, the Department of Health is authorized to treat these
reports as a complaint if the case was closed within the prior six years
with a payment of at least $50,000, and investigate to determine if the
facts suggest that it should submit the file to the Board of Medicine
for possible discipline. 1
79
Nonetheless, one may be concerned that the State fails to act in
too many situations where a doctor has demonstrated that he or she
has problems that may interfere with the ability to consistently pro-
vide good medical care.180 Observers have suggested that state boards
of medicine frequently lack sufficient resources to investigate thor-
oughly even all the situations brought to their attention.' 81 And these
178 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.049 (West 2007).
179 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.073(1) (West 2007). This provision tracked the
language of 456.072(2)(t), prior to its revision by Fla. Laws Ch. 2005-266 (enacted in
response to the passage of amendment 8). Under that version, the Board could disci-
pline a physician for repeated malpractice, defined to include "three or more claims
for medical malpractice within the previous 5-year period resulting in indemnities
being paid in excess of $50,000 in a judgment or settlement." According to the MQA
Annual Report for 2005-06, 1431 closed claims against medical doctors were reported
to them, three investigations were opened because the practitioner had three or more
closed claims within the prior five years and five closed claims investigations led to
discipline. FLA. DEPT. OF HEALTH Div. OF MEDICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE, ANNUAL
REPORT: JULY 1, 2005 - JUNE 30, 2006, 38 (2006). Note that closed claims includes
settlements as well as judgments and so may include cases in which the evidence of
malpractice is weak but the potential damages are sufficiently high that settlement is
highly rational for the defense.
180 A frequent source of criticism is that boards of medicine repeatedly sanc-
tion the same physicians; the inference is that the first sanction was inadequate and
this indicates that the board is ineffective. A prime advocate of this view is Public
Citizen. In one publication it asserted that "[slix percent of the doctors in Florida are
responsible for half the malpractice," yet the licensing board has not been effective in
reducing malpractice. PUBLIC CITIZEN, BAD DOCTORS, supra note 172; see also Grant
& Alfred, supra note 177, at 877-78 & tbl.3. The authors analyze Federation of State
Medical Boards data and show that those who have been sanctioned once are dispro-
portionately likely to be sanctioned again. Using other data sets, they show a similar
pattern in malpractice judgments. Id. at 878-81 & tbl.4. In contrast, a typical system
for dealing with human error is a form of progressive discipline; a large percentage of
those disciplined once will not get into trouble again. The fact that there is recidivism
indicates a weakness in the malpractice disciplinary system, at least insofar as there
is an alternative system that could have predicted with reasonable accuracy which
among the pool of first offenders would turn out to be incapable of rehabilitation and
used that knowledge to determine appropriate sanctions.
"" See R. John Kinkel & Norma C. Josef, Disciplining Doctors: How Medi-
cal Boards are Dealing with Problem Physicians in the Midwest, 9 Res. in the Soc. of
Health Care 207, 211-12 (1991); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERviCES, REGION I, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OvERVEw
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boards may well be inhibited from acting by the kind of professional
courtesy that affects all professional self-regulation.1
82
This does not necessarily translate, however, into a conclusion
that all situations of three or more malpractice judgments should lead
to license revocation. As an absolute matter, it is obvious that most
incidents of malpractice do not currently lead to disciplinary action, in
Florida or elsewhere. 83 But on reflection, it is also obvious that they
should not. Most automobile accidents, even if one of the drivers was
at fault, do not lead to license revocation or even suspension. Is revo-
cation, however, the appropriate answer for "repeat offenders"? The
answer may often be yes. Surely the doctors who are the topic of Pub-
lic Citizen's horror stories should have been subject to intervention
and, if rehabilitation were unsuccessful, removed from practice before
they had the opportunity to cause so much harm.l 4 But license revo-
cation is not always the correct response. Consider the problem of
(1986).
In Florida, the first steps of receiving complaints and investigating are done by the
Department of Health, which deals with all complaints against health care providers.
FLA. STAT. § 456.073 (1)-(2); it is thus unusually difficult to assess resources since
the resources at this stage are a common pool for these and a variety of other issues
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Health.
182 See, e.g., STANLEY J. GROSS, OF FoxEs AND HEN HOUSES: LICENSING AND
THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS (1993); Robert A. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An
Analysis of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L. J. 683, 691
(1991); Mark Crane, Why Did It Take So Long To Nail This Crooked Doctor? 66
MED. ECON. 54 (March 20 1989). Similar criticisms have been made regarding the
effectiveness of lawyer discipline, which also is a government function carried out by
a body largely made up of fellow professionals. According to the President of the
Florida Bar, approximately 9,000 complaints are made per year against lawyers;
between 20 and 38 lawyers are subject to disbarment, the most serious punishment, an
additional 133-155 were suspended. Medical Malpractice Hearing, supra note 161,
at 134-37 (statement of Miles McGrane).
183 Grant and Alfred indicated that the total number of annual sanctions of all
types for all behaviors nationwide during the period from 1992 to 2004 ranged from
3370 to 6212. Grant & Alfred, supra note 177, at 874 tbl.I. Meanwhile, the Institute
of Medicine has estimated that there were between 44,000 and 98,000 annual hospital
deaths due to medical error. COMM. ON QUALTY HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED.
To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds,
2000) [hereinafter IOM 2000]. The MQA data cited in n.179 supra indicates a similar
gap.
184 See PUBLIC CmzEN, BAD DOCTORS, supra note 172, at 7-9. See also Timo-
thy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality
of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REv. 525 (1988); See generally Timothy Stolzfus Jost,
Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market?
37 ARIz. L. REv. 825 (1995). Other sources affirm that a small but significant per-
centage of doctors, often estimated at five percent, have impairments that should lead
to restrictions on their right of practice. See DERBYSHIRE, supra note 176 at 88;
sources cited in Adler, supra note 182, at 690 n.26.
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disentangling cause and effect. We know that most incidents of avoid-
able adverse events, or even malpractice, do not lead to lawsuits.
18 5
For a variety of reasons, patients do not sue. 86 A doctor who has been
sued once, however, is considerably more likely to be sued again. 1
7
One explanation: he is an incompetent physician who needs to be re-
moved. Another: he is arrogant and rude and his patients are consis-
tently more willing to sue him when things go wrong. The doctor
might be well-insured or have substantial assets that could be reached
to satisfy a malpractice judgment. 8 8 Plaintiffs' attorneys are more
likely to bring suit against a physician with past malpractice judg-
ments because the likelihood of a good settlement is higher. Finally,
physicians in certain specialties such as obstetrics and neurosurgery,
where the expected harm from an act of malpractice is much higher,
are more likely to be sued repeatedly than are dermatologists or gas-
troenterologists of equal skill. 189
185 The Harvard Medical Practice Study showed that "there were more than
seven negligent injuries for every medical malpractice claim and, accordingly, that
most patients injured as a result of negligent medical management do not make a
claim," Tom Baker, Reconsidering The Harvard Medical Practice Study Conclusions
About The Validity Of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 501, 503
(2005).
186 According to one source, "[t]he number of medical errors reported by
Florida hospitals exceeds the number of medical malpractice claims filed each year by
6 to 1." PUBLIC CITIZEN, BAD DOCTORS, supra note 172.
187 Id. at 6-7. Somewhat surprisingly, past malpractice claims is a weaker
predictor of future claims than a combination of demographic and practice pattern
information, such as activity level of surgery, age, and practicing in an inner city
hospital or in an area with a large Medicaid population. John E. Rolph, John L. Ad-
ams, & Kimberly A. McGuigan, Identifying Malpractice-Prone Physicians, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 125 (2007).
188 Leaders at the University of Miami Medical School have regularly decried
the perceived effects of defendants' resources when the plaintiff is deciding whom to
sue in a malpractice action. See e-mail from John G. Clarkson, Former Dean, Univ. of
Miami Miller Sch. of Med., to Mary Coombs, Professor of Law, Univ. of Miami Sch.
of Law (Oct. 4, 2007, 12:45 EST) (on file with Health Matrix). Physicians associated
with the university have the university's deep pockets available to them, whereas
Jackson Memorial Hospital, which is where many of these physicians practice, is
funded by a public trust and is thus insulated by sovereign immunity. See id.
189 In addition, mere randomness would mean that some physicians would be
the subject of more than one claim, and almost by definition, they would contribute
disproportionately to the total payouts. It is unclear if these theories can fully account
for data such as that in a study of physicians in Washington, D.C. which showed that
4.3% of all physicians, each with two or more payouts, were responsible for 47.3%
of the value of all judgments and settlements. PUBLIC CITIZEN, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PAYOUT TRENDS 1991-2004: EVIDENCE SHOWS LAWSUITS
HAVEN'T CAUSED DOCTORS' INSURANCE WOES 2 (2005), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/WDC2005malpracticeanalysis.pdf
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Note also that barring physicians with three or more judgments
against them will have only a limited effect on the extent of malprac-
tice; most incidents of avoidable error and even of malpractice are the
consequence of predictable errors by essentially good doctors. 19°
Nonetheless, to the extent there is a core of dangerous doctors, the
disciplinary system should remove them.19 And doing so may re-
spond to an understandable public desire for retribution against "bad
apples." Much of the general population also apparently believes that
suspending the licenses of health professionals who make mistakes is
among the "very effective" solutions to medical error. 192 The language
190 The patient safety movement is built around the insight that most avoid-
able errors are the consequence of bad systems rather than simply bad doctors. See,
e.g., IOM 2000, supra note 183; Lucian L. Leape, Foreword: Preventing Medical
Accidents: Is "Systems Analysis" The Answer?, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 145 (2001). Cf.
John L. Adams & Steven Garber, Reducing Medical Malpractice by Targeting Physi-
cians Making Medical Malpractice Payments, 4 J. E~mpmcAL LEGAL STuD. 185, 198-
202 (2007) (demonstrating with mathematical models that investigating all physicians
with multiple paid claims would have a de minimis effect, at most, in the future rate
of malpractice, because the relatively low rate of malpractice causing sufficient injury
to induce claims and the imperfect correlation between malpractice in fact, suing and
obtaining compensation means that only a tiny percentage of all malpractice is com-
mitted by those who have had such paid claims in the past). While Amendment Eight
would have been limited to those with judgments, not settlements, and would have led
to automatic revocation, this is unlikely to change the conclusions of that study.
191 Timothy Stolzfus Jost carefully distinguishes between the kinds of quality
of care problems best dealt with by physician education or systems changes and those
most amenable to discipline. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regula-
tion, Management, or the Market?, supra note 184, at 841. Even where a physician is
substantially less competent than average, the most effective and appropriate response
may involve forms of discipline that improve his performance or channel it in ways
that minimize his ability to do harm, rather than a license revocation.
192 When asked whether various measures would be very effective, twenty-
three percent of the public selected "increasing lawsuits for malpractice," and fifty
percent selected "suspending the licenses of health professionals who make medical
.errors;" unsurprisingly only three and one percent respectively of doctors surveyed
selected these as effective options.. Robert J. Blendon, et al. Views of Practicing
Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors, 347 New Eng. J. Med. 1933, 1938 tbl.4
(2002). Contrast that with the claim of Dr. Carl Flatley, the head of Floridians for
Patient Protection (the group created by trial lawyers to get the amendment on the
ballot) that "[there are a small minority of doctors that cause the problems." Lisa
Greene, Few Doctors Will Pay Under Amendment, ST. PETERSBURG TMEs, July 21,
2004, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/07/21/State/Fewdoctorswill-pay_.shtml. It is impos-
sible to know if the public would want physicians who had lost multiple suits sanc-
tioned as a form of punishment even if they knew that doing so would have no meas-
urable effect on the quality of future care.
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of "three strikes and you're out" with which Amendment Eight was
promoted fed into these public views.
193
All this, however, is based on a narrow and static view of what
Amendment Eight would have done. Its primary effect would have
been to make incurring even a second malpractice judgment in Florida
highly dangerous to a physician's livelihood. Physicians would feel
forced to settle any case where there was even a small chance that
they might lose at trial 1 94 Plaintiffs' attorneys would be encouraged
to bring more and weaker cases. 195 Malpractice insurance rates would
rise. 196 Physicians would make additional efforts to avoid being sued.
While some of these results are desirable - more care to avoid error
and better communication with patients both before and after treat-
ment -- others, such as increased defensive medicine, avoiding higher
risk specialties or pgatient populations, and not locating one's practice
in Florida, are not.
193 It also, of course, evoked an analogy between bad doctors and the career
criminals to whom the phrase had earlier been applied.
194 "Three strikes and you're out: well, it is essentially meaningless from a
practical perspective, because what I see is a wedge issue for mandating the settle-
ment of cases." Interview with William Large, supra note 30, (transcript at 7). See
also Chaires, supra note 85.
195 Indeed, the one group that would seem clearly to benefit from the passage
of Amendment Eight was its sponsor, the plaintiffs' trial bar, whose bargaining posi-
tion would be enhanced.
196 Chaires, supra note 85, at 3; see also Randall R. Bovbjerg & Laurence R.
Tancredi, Liability Reform Should Make Patients Safer: "Avoidable Classes of
Events" Are a Key Improvement, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 478, 493 (2005) ("[Amend-
ment 8] may prompt more lawsuits and will certainly raise physicians' willingness to
settle cases before trial, probably at higher levels of payment.").
197 There is little data to support the sweeping claims that the malpractice
litigation crisis has led to a shortage of physicians in the state. When leaders of the
Florida Medical Association testified under oath, they conceded that their claims were
based on anecdotal evidence without any data indicating a pattern of physicians leav-
ing Florida or shutting down their practices. Medical Malpractice Hearing, supra
note 161, at 96-97, 101 (statement of Jeff Scott, FMA counsel), 125-30 (statement of
Sandra Mortham, FMA CEO). According to the Annual Reports of the Medical Qual-
ity Assurance Commission, a state agency, there were 50,407 active licensed medical
doctors in Florida in 2005-06 (of which 11,391 were listed as out of state), 2005-2006
FL. DEP'T OF HEALTH Div. OF MED. QUALrrY ASSURANCE ANN. REP., AT 27; 47,805 in
2003-04 (17,849 out of state), 2003-2004 FL. DEP'T OF HEALTH Div. OF MED.
QuALrY ASSURANCE ANN. REP., AT 24; and 43,517 in 2001-02 (when the report did
not break out out-of-state Florida licensed doctors), 2001-2002 FL. DEP'T OF HEALTH
Drv. OF MED. QuALrTY AssuRANcE ANN. REP., AT 41. Annual reports are available at
www.doh.state.fl.us/mqa/reports.htm Data from 2002-03 indicates that Florida was
below average, but far from the bottom, among states in the number of physicians per
capita. HEALTH RES. & SERvs. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SEavs.,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE ANALYsIs: U.S. HEALTH WORKFORCE
PERsONNEL FACTBOOK, tbl.222,
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The most difficult reform to assess is Amendment Seven. On its
face, it seems to provide a very broad right of access to records. 198 The
right belongs to patients, but that term includes "any individual who
has sought, is seeking, is undergoing or has undergone care or treat-
ment in a health care facility or by a health care provider."' 99 Depend-
ing on whether proof of a concrete plan to seek care were required,
this definition might not exclude anyone. 2°° Read literally, it does not
limit the "patient" to seeking records only from the particular facilities
or providers with whom she has, or is considering having, a treatment
relationship.2°' While the records are limited to those "relating to any
adverse medical incident," this last phrase is defined extremely
broadly:
The phrase 'adverse medical incident' means medical negli-
gence, intentional misconduct, and any other act, neglect, or
default of a health care facility or health care provider that
caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient,
including, but not limited to, those incidents that are required
by state or federal law to be reported to any governmental
agency or body, and incidents that are reported to or reviewed
by any health care facility peer review, risk management,
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/reports/factbook.htm. Interestingly, Florida was
disproportionately low in the number of primary care physicians, a category at a
relatively low risk of malpractice claims. See id. It is quite plausible, however, that
fear of sanctions, whether malpractice judgments directly or the indirect effect of such
judgments that Amendment Eight threatened, might lead some physicians to practice
less, to relocate their practices away from southern Florida (seen as the more litiga-
tion-prone region), to reduce or eliminate the practice of higher risk specialties such
as obstetrics, and to avoid patients seen as high risk. The amendment would thus have
had a disproportionate effect on such specialties, perhaps exacerbating the shortages
of those physicians. It is, unfortunately, very difficult to find more than anecdotal
evidence at this level of specificity. (For an example of such anecdotal evidence, see
Medical Malpractice Hearing, supra note 161, at 125-7 (Mortham statement)).
198 "[P]atients have a right to have access to any records made or received in
the course of business by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse
medical incident." Fla. Const. Art. X, § 25(a).
199 Fla. Const. Art. X, § 25(c)(2).
" If, as the proponents argue, this is to serve as a consumer information
device, one might want the information prior to making any decision about where to
seek treatment or from whom.
201 If so read it would facilitate requests in the context of investigative jour-
nalism. And it is difficult to conceive of what sort of proof the person seeking infor-
mation would have to provide to the health care provider that she was considering
seeking medical care from him or her. Note that the Florida Supreme Court rejected
the attempted narrowing of this portion of the amendment by legislation. Florida
Hospital Waterman v Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 493 (2008)
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quality assurance, credentials, or similar committee, or any
representative of any such committees. 2°2
It thus includes near-misses as well as adverse medical events as
ordinarily defined. It includes, "but [is] not limited to," reports relat-
ing to incidents that must be reported to any governmental body, and
to reports either created by, or reviewed by, any of a wide range of
internal review committees and the members thereof. It is difficult to
imagine any form of peer review that would not be included. The term
"records" is undefined and thus might include notes and drafts as well
as any final reports.2°3 Furthermore, as an attorney who represents
hospitals noted, absent limiting legislation, it might require, in addi-
tion to the material more obviously covered by the language above,
the production of patient complaint forms, hospital incident reports,
and loss runs, (i.e., the list of open cases with the amount that had
been reserved for indemnity and expenses), since all these are "made
or received in the course of business" and relate to adverse medical
incidents. 204 The law would create substantial burdens, particularly on
health care facilities, to keep the relevant documents, access them
when requested, and redact any patient-identifying information.2 6
Even after the voiding of many of the provisions of the "imple-
menting legislation," the impact of Amendment Seven may turn out to
be less than would appear from the language. First, the Patient Safety
& Quality Improvement Act of 2005 may provide federal protection
against discoverability for at least some of these records.2 7 Second,
202 Fl. Const. Art. X, § 25(c)(3).
203 See Florida Hospital Waterman v Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 492 (2008)
(rejecting statutory limit to "final reports").
204 Interview with Gail Parenti, supra note 33, (transcript at 8).
205 It was this concern that led the hospitals to request that the legislation state
that no records created prior to November 2, 2004 be required to be produced and
that, going forward, records need only be provided for the four years prior to the date
of any request. Fla. Stat. § 381.028(5). The Florida Supreme Court rejected the first
limitation and has not spoken to the validity of the latter. Florida Hospital Waterman
v Buster, 984 So. 2d 478,492-94 (2008)
206 As acknowledged in Fla. Const. Art. X, § 25(b), such redaction is required
by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [HIPAA], Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
207 "[P]atient safety work product shall be privileged and shall not be...
subject to discovery in connection with a . . . State . . . civil or administrative pro-
ceeding." Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §
299b-22(a) (Supp. 2007). "Patient safety work product" is defined to include "data,
reports, records, memoranda, analyses ... or written or oral statements ... which
identify or constitute the deliberations or analysis of ... a patient safety evaluation
system," which in turn is defined to mean "the collection, management, or analysis of
20081
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some of those subject to Amendment Seven indicated that they would
reorganize some of their peer review processes by involving their at-
torneys more closely and thus, they hope, bringing the records within
the attorney-client privilege.2 °s Finally, it is possible, especially if the
ill-effects that physicians and hospitals foresee come to pass, that the
Amendment might be repealed. The Florida state Representative most
involved in the drafting and passage of the statute, David Simmons,
said that in that situation he would "push to have the Legislature place
a measure on the ballot to repeal [the] Amendment. ' 2°
If Amendment Seven has the impact that its text suggests, the
benefits may well be less and the costs higher than its proponents and
the voters assumed. Amendment Seven was promoted as a consumer
protection measure, providing people information about hospitals and
doctors that they could use in deciding where to obtain the best, safest
health care. How valuable that information would be to consumers
depends both on its accuracy and usability and on the sources of in-
formation otherwise available. There are already a number of entry
points through which a consumer could learn about a physician or a
hospital.
As for physicians, the most extensive source of information, in-
cluding malpractice payments, adverse actions by licensing boards,
actions by hospitals regarding clinical privileges and professional so-
ciety actions is the National Practitioner Data Bank; however, this is
not accessible to the general public.210 Florida does have a state level
web resource, the Practitioner Profile. 211 Anyone can look up a li-
censed practitioner by name or license number. The profile includes
information on education, staff privileges, reported financial respon-
information for reporting to or by a patient safety organization." Id. § 299b-21(6). The
FMA leadership indicated that the Act "might lend itself to a form where you could
shelter things," FMA interview, supra note 37, (transcript at 17). In effect, insofar as
the kinds of reports otherwise subject to discovery under Fl. Const. Art. X, § 25 are
prepared for provision to patient safety organizations, they will instead be privileged.
Indeed, the FMA sought to invoke the preemptive effect of PSQIA in Florida Hospital
Assoc. v. Viamonte, No. 4:08cv312 (N.D. Fla, filed July 10, 2008).
208 FMA interview, supra note 37, (transcript at 10).
209 Dan Lynch & Harris Meyer, Revealing Discovery, DAILY Bus. REV. Al,
(Sept. 28 2005). Doctors and hospitals might also seek federal legislation or regula-
tion expanding the federal protective umbrella of PSQIA. See note 207, supra.
210 The only exception is that a plaintiff or his attorney may access the data-
bank if they have sued a hospital and seek to show that the hospital did not, as re-
quired, query the data bank in the course of granting or continuing a physician's cre-
dentials. See NATIONAL PRAcITIONER DATA BANK, FACT SHEET FOR ATrORNEYS.
http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov//pubs/fslFactSheet.pdf.
211 See FLA. DEPT. OF HEALTH, A GuIDE TO THE FLORIDA PRACTITIONER
PRoFILE (2007), http://www.doh.state.fl.us/mqa/Profiling/guide.pdf
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sibility, legal actions, board final disciplinary actions taken against the
doctor, and liability claims against the practitioner above a dollar
threshold ($100,000 for physicians). In theory, this resource should
provide essentially all the information that would be available through
the NPDB. However, much of the information is self-reported and
thus important negative information may not appear.212
There are also public resources to compare hospitals. Florida's
Agency for Health Care Administration has a website which allows
the user to find information about any hospital in the state, including
readmission rates, mortality rates, infection rates, and complication
rates: in some cases the site includes national and statewide averages
as a benchmark.213 The U.S. Department of Health & Human Ser-
vices also has a website that allows the user to compare hospitals.
214
The HHS site provides information on the frequency with which the
hospital provides specific recommended treatments for heart attack,
heart failure, pneumonia and surgery. Neither of these sites necessar-
ily provide all the specific information a consumer might want to
know, and they do rely on self-reporting. On the other hand, the in-
formation provided is substantial and the sites are easily navigated to
find reasonably comprehensive, comparative information about spe-
cific hospitals.
It seems doubtful that there is much additional consumer value in
being able to obtain the information that is made available via
Amendment Seven. Depending on the scope of the request, it could
212 Among the items of information subject to Department of Health verifica-
tion are licensure, licensure elsewhere, staff privileges and degrees [these are verified
at the time of initial licensure, but any later changes are not], information about final
disciplinary actions within the prior ten years taken by licensing agencies, specialty
boards, health maintenance organizations, clinics, nursing homes and hospitals, resig-
nations from or revocation of such privileges; and liability claims. Id. At least one
newspaper report indicated that some information that should have appeared, under
the Department of Health's own rules and systems, was absent. See Jacob Goldstein,
State's Files on Doctors Fall Short, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 10 2006, at IA. Some other
information, such as malpractice claims history, could be verified, since this data is
independently reported to the Department of Health by the Office of Insurance Regu-
lation,
213 Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., Connecting Florida with Health Care
Information, http://www.floridahealthfinder.gov/CompareCare/SelectChoice.aspx
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008). Legislation in 2006 requires hospitals to provide this
information and the agency to make it publicly available. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
408.05(3)(k), 408.061 (West Supp. 2008).
214 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Hospital Compare,
http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov/HospitaUStatic/About-
Overview.asp?dest=NAVlHomelAboutlOverview#TabTop (last visited Feb. 18,
2008).
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readily result in too much information for effective decision mak-
ing.215 Furthermore, if consumers were to obtain all the information
available through Amendment Seven on several practitioners or facili-
ties, they might well be misled. This essentially raw data does not
include the guidance that the various websites provide on how to as-
sess the data. A consumer might well assume that more reports of
adverse incidents is evidence of more adverse incidents, and thus of a
practitioner or facility to be avoided, without taking account of such
confounding factors as the patient population or a commitment to pa-
tient safety, which might be manifested by more self-scrutiny and thus
more reports.216
A distinct use of Amendment Seven -- probably the one most de-
sired by its proponents -- is as a tool for malpractice litigation.217 The
records themselves are inadmissible, and the proponents concede that
Amendment Seven would not change that.218 But the records might
lead to admissible evidence by pointing the plaintiff to potential wit-
215 Cf Judith H. Hibbard, Paul Slovic & Jacquelyn J. Jewett, Informing Con-
sumer Decisions in Health Care: Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75
MILBANK Q. 395, 399 (1997) (demonstrating that heuristics may lead people to make
worse decisions, in terms of their own values, when there is too much, too compli-
cated information).
216 "Good hospital systems have a lot of hospital incident reports because they
have people who are caring about what happens, so they want to have an increase
every year in the number of things that are reported." Interview with Gail Parenti,
supra note 33, (transcript at 8). This problem is particularly acute since Amendment
Seven extends to reports of near-misses. Neither JCAHO nor the State require such
reports; see Fla. Stat. § 395.0197(7); JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, SENTINEL EVENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE, July 2007,
available at http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/PolicyandProcedures/
The federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 encourages report-
ing of near-misses but protects reports done following its procedures with guarantees
of confidentiality. See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) of 2005,
42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (Supp. 2007). A facility that creates near-miss related
reports is thus one which is taking a more proactive stance in advancing patient safety
and yet could appear to be less safe.
There is a similar problem of potential misuse of information about indi-
vidual practitioners since outcomes may "depend on processes mainly under the con-
trol of health systems." William M. Sage, Joshua Graff Zivin & Nathaniel B. Chase,
Bridging the Relational-Regulatory Gap: A Pragmatic Information Policy for Patient
Safety and Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1278 (2006).
217 Courts had generally rejected the argument that documents to which a
person was otherwise entitled under Amendment Seven magically become inaccessi-
ble once the person filed a malpractice suit. See, e.g., Michota v. Bayfront Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 2005 WL 900771 Fla. Cir. Ct. at *5 (holding that "the discoverability of these
documents in civil litigation can be no more narrow than the right of access this same
patient would have if he sought access before becoming a litigant").
218 AFTL interview, supra note 32, (transcript at 14).
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nesses who might be willing to speak, and by providing a road map
for questioning defendants.21 9 Counsel for both plaintiffs and defen-
dants see such records as extremely useful for plaintiffs. A plaintiff's
lawyer said that the discovery of records that a physician had commit-
ted errors in the past, and that a hospital was aware of it, "would lead
to early resolution of disputes.,, 220 An attorney who represents hospi-
tals said that "the availability of material like this in a suit has a dra-
matic impact on the settlement dynamic." 22 1 There is no neutral objec-
tive point from which to assess whether this would ultimately be good
or bad for patients.
The most significant likely impact of Amendment Seven will be
on the peer review system, and thus on the processes of patient safety.
Essentially all of these processes are privileged; the processes are to
be treated as confidential, participants may not testify about them, and
the documentation created is neither discoverable nor admissible un-
der statutory law prior to Amendment Seven.222 The Florida courts
had read these protections broadly, consistent with the perceived high
social value of these processes and the need for privilege.
[D]octors seem to be reluctant to engage in strict peer review
due to a number of apprehensions: loss of referrals, respect,
and friends, possible retaliations, vulnerability to torts, and
fear of malpractice actions in which the records of the peer
review proceedings might be used. It is this ambivalence that
lawmakers seek to avert and eliminate by shielding peer re-
view deliberations from legal attacks.223
There is apparent unanimous agreement that patient safety meas-
ures are socially desirable, and that the system to develop such meas-
219 Information that has been presented to a medical review committee is not
privileged if it is also available from some other source. Mount Sinai Med. Ctrs. of
Greater Miami, Inc v. Bernstein, 645 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (cita-
tion omitted). For example, a plaintiff could not obtain a defendant's application for
staff privileges from the credentialing committee, but could obtain them from the
defendant physician himself. Boca Raton Cmty. Hospital v. Jones, 584 So. 2d 220
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
220 Lynch and Meyer, supra note 209.
221 Id. (quoting an attorney, whose firm represents malpractice defendants).
222 See, e.g., Fla. Stat 395.0191(8); 395.0193(8);766.101(5). See generally
Jason A. McGrath, A Practical Guide to Protected Internal Healthcare Facility In-
formation and Documents in Florida, 25(2) TRIAL ADvoc. Q., Spring 2006, at 13.
223 Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111, 115 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Gregory G.
Gosfield, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q.
552, 558 (1979)); see also Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984).
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ures depends on a sufficiently reliable system for reporting errors.224
There is also a wide, though not universal consensus, that the protec-
tions of confidentiality and immunity for reports of errors are crucial to
ensuring the data necessary for patient safety processes.225 The con-
sensus view is based on a number of claims. Those industries in which
safety measures have been particularly effective, such as the airline
industry, protect error reports from discovery.226 Effectively promoting
patient safety is seen as requiring a focus on systems, rather than a
culture of blaming; punishing those whose errors are reported is thus
counter-productive. 2 7 Health care personnel are generally viewed as
reluctant to report errors, whether theirs or their colleagues, for a vari-
ety of reasons.228 Some empirical data confirms these claims.229
One of the perceived impediments to open reporting of errors in
the health-care setting is the risk of blame through the malpractice
system. 230 Thus patient safety advocates often support measures to
narrow, or even displace that system.231 Others, by contrast, insist on
224 William Sage and his co-authors refer to "the political ascendancy of
'patient safety."' Sage, et al., supra note 216, at 1269. Reporting is, of course, neces-
sary but not sufficient. There must also be a commitment to analysis and follow-up if
change is to occur. IOM 2000, supra note 183, at 87; see, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg,
Beyond Tort Reform: Fixing Real Problems, 3 Ind. Health L. Rev. 3, 16-17 (2006)
(describing patient safety as "the most promising difference" from earlier times).
225 "Fear of legal discoverability or involvement in the legal process is be-
lieved to contribute to underreporting of errors." IOM 2000, supra note 183, at 127;
see also Barry R. Furrow, Medical Mistakes: Tiptoeing Toward Safety, 3 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 181, 183 (2003); Brian A. Liang & Steven D. Small, Communi-
cating About Care: Addressing Federal-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to
Promote Patient Safety, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 219, 225 (2003).
226 See Bryan A. Liang, Error in Medicine: Legal Impediments To U.S. Re-
form, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 27, 29-30, 42 (1999).
227 See IOM 2000, supra note 183, at 87. See also Ansley Boyd Barton, Re-
cent Remedies for Health Care Ills, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 831, 837-38, 840-41 (2005)
(describing the effect of mandatory reporting requirements).
228 See, e.g., Bovbjerg, supra note 224, at 6; Furrow, supra note 225, at 192;
ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE
94-97 (2002) (describing the various reasons why health care professionals find it
difficult to take action when a colleague shows signs of being a danger to his or her
patients).
229 See studies cited in Sage, et al. supra note 216, at 1289 nn. 79-80.
230 See Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 196, at 497 (quoting quality im-
provement advocate Donald Berwick, "[T]he tort system poisons the openness and
honesty that are preconditions to safety improvement,"); see also IOM Report 2000,
supra note 183, at 109-110.
231 See Bovbjerg, supra note 224, at 17. The IOM 2000 report floated the idea
of no-fault or enterprise liability - ideas which went nowhere - in part as reforms that
"might promote reporting by eliminating the adversarial inquiry into fault and blame
that characterizes the current liability system." IOM 2000, supra note 183, at 111.
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the values advanced by malpractice litigation, and resist "tort reforms"
which fail to provide adequate alternatives for compensating those
who are injured, and/or deterring harmful medical error. 232 Other
scholars argue that the reporting that patient safety advocates insist is
essential is not dependent on confidentiality or protection from the
risk of malpractice litigation.233 The requisite open sharing of error
reports has never been part of the culture of medicine, even when
malpractice suits were far rarer than they are now.234 And even with
protections, the level of reporting, whether voluntary or "mandatory,"
235is frequently too low to serve its purposes.
When the question is the extent to which malpractice liability risk
should be reduced in order to induce more reporting and analysis of
error and thus to promote patient safety, the answer is unclear.
236
There is little direct data to support the "common wisdom . . that
medical malpractice lawsuits impede efforts to improve health care
quality by encouraging providers to hide mistakes. 2 37 Indeed, the
opponents of those using patient safety as an argument to support "tort
reform" note that the biggest patient safety success story has been in
anesthesiology, 238 and a major impetus for that project was the ex-
tremely high malpractice risks and malpractice insurance rates anes-
thesiologists had been experiencing.239
232 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 153; Bovbjerg & Tancredi, supra note 196, at
480-81 (noting that patient safety advocates undermine the political viability of their
cause by linking it to reducing legal remedies for injured patients).
233 Cf. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost but No
Benefit - Is It Time for a Change? 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 9-12 (1999) (noting a study
showing that confidentiality protections are not correlated with greater use of the peer
review process).
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality
in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90
Cornell L. Rev. 893, 925-26 (2005).
235 See Furrow, supra note 225, at 203; Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting
Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems Made a
Measurable Difference?, 15 Health Matrix 329, 351-52 (2005). Harrington notes the
strikingly disparate number of adverse incident reports in New York and Florida, and
suggests one possible reason is substantially different rates of under-reporting. Id. at
364-65.
236 As noted in Sage, et al., supra note 216, at 1271, there is a tension between
the needs of improvement and accountability in terms of the availability of informa-
tion about medical error.
237 Hyman & Silver, supra note 234, at 893.
238 Id. at 917; see GAWANDE, supra note 228, at 64-69.
239 Frederick W. Cheney, ASA Closed Claim Project: Where Have We Been
and Where Are We Going?, 57 ASA NEWsLErlER 8 (1993), cited in BAKER, supra
note 153, at 108-09.
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If the question, however, is the desirability of Amendment Seven,
the balance shifts, I believe, rather decisively, against it. The benefit
to current and potential future patients of having ready access to this
information is more attenuated than is the benefit of malpractice liti-
gation itself. And the deleterious effect on people's willingness to
report adverse events and participate in root cause analyses is far more
direct. The precise effect of Amendment Seven is to promise that the
reports one makes and other documentation of one's participation in
various forms of peer review can readily become public, 240 evoking all
the reasons people are reluctant to make such reports. 241
In the case of each amendment, some modification of the law in
the direction of the proposal might be a genuinely positive reform. In
each case, however, the specific proposal incorporated in the Florida
Constitution, standing alone, is so extreme that its downsides almost
surely outweigh its benefits.
We don't and probably can't, at this point, know what will work to
protect patients, compensate those avoidably injured, ensure that the
needed health care providers and facilities are available and affordable,
and facilitate the processes that can make all this possible. We may, at
least, make some progress, by knowing what will not work.
CONCLUSION
The changes wrought by Amendments Three, Seven and Eight,
had they occurred as intended by their proponents, would likely have
been bad for patients. This is unsurprising given the processes by
which they were proposed and enacted. Each Amendment was de-
signed by a single stakeholder, trial lawyers (Seven and Eight) or phy-
sicians (Three). The primary purpose seemed to be to harm, or
threaten to harm, the interests of other stakeholders, trial lawyers
(Three) or physicians and hospitals (Seven and Eight), although the
amendments had to be "sold" to the public as designed to advance the
public interest. Given that dual nature, they were drafted to serve the
interests of the sponsors as much as possible, while still being suffi-
240 Recall that the Amendment seems on its face not limited to final reports or
to conclusions leading to actions; thus it provides public access and scrutiny to far
more than needs to be reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank.
241 Two of the strongest opponents of the argument that malpractice liability
impedes effective communication among providers, note that "the risk of a leak [to
potential plaintiffs or their attorneys] is substantially attenuated by the statutory peer
review protections most states have put into place." David A. Hyman & Charles Sil-
ver, Speak Not of Error: Does Legal Fear Increase the Risk of Medical Error?,
REcGULATION, Spring 2005, at 52, 55.
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ciently appealing to the electorate.242 The pattern seemed to be to take
something that already existed as part of a larger reform project else-
where, extract it, and push it to an extreme. Furthermore, because
these proposals were amendments to the state constitution, they
needed to be clear, simple, and unsubtle. 43 Finally, the expectations
of both the proponents and of the voters may have been that this was
the final word on these issues. In fact, even constitutional initiatives
can serve as one stage in a complex governance process. But expecta-
tions of the various stakeholders may run the risk of making further
governance changes harder, even if experience shows the undesirabil-
ity of the provisions as enacted. It may also evoke cynicism if the citi-
zenry feels that their wishes, as embodied in the amendments, are
frustrated by legislatures or courts.
This story also, I hope, demonstrates the value of such story-
telling. Legal scholarship has traditionally been analytic, whether it is
done at the level of specific doctrine, or is more conceptual and theo-
retical. Critical race theory and critical feminist theory led the way to
the addition of narrative as an explicit aspect of legal scholarship, and
a necessary corrective to the hegemonic views of law and the obscur-
ing of the relevance of race and gender to what the law does, and how
it is explored in traditional scholarship. 24 Although there was much
dispute in the 1980s and 1990s about the legitimacy of such scholar-
ship and the appropriate role it should play within the universe of le-
gal scholarship, 24 it now seems to have been accepted as a legitimate
242 Indeed, when asked in late 2006, if they would have done anything differ-
ently, Paul Jess, one of the AFTL leaders, indicated that they would have crafted the
language of Amendments Seven and Eight to poll a smaller majority, so the FMA
would have been induced to use some of their resources in an attempt to fend them
off, rather than concentrating entirely on passing Amendment Three. AFTL interview,
supra note 32, (transcript at 15).
243 They could not have the complexity of legislation and they had to be writ-
ten to appeal to the average voter, who might base his or her vote on a brief review of
the title and summary.
244 Some of the most prominent and most influential works in the field have
been collected within the anthologies edited by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic,
see, e.g., The Cutting Edge (2000), and been the subject of discussions of the field in
the works cited in the sources in note 245, infra. The term has sometimes also in-
cluded the use of explicitly fictional writings to illuminate limitations in dominant
scholarship or political understandings. Among the most prominent practitioners are
Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JuSTICE (1987), RICHARD DELGADO, THE
RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995).
245 See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 5 (1997) and Richard Delgado, On
Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665
(1993). There are also less contentious approaches to these questions. See, e.g., Jane
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part of the universe of legal scholarship. 24 6 But narrative as an aspect
of legal scholarship is not, and should not be, limited to those stories
in which the author is herself a part of the story, or to voices from the
bottom, though these may well be the voices most obscured by tradi-
tional scholarship. Law, particularly the common law, is shot through
with stories.24 7 There does not appear to be the same narrative urge
within legal scholarship for the "back stories" of legislation. 248 It is
sometimes useful, as I hope it has been here, to provide such a story, a
"thick description" if you will, of how legal change occurred. We can
see how the multiple, sometimes conflicting, sometimes overlapping,
agendas of various legal actors operated to produce outcomes and lay
the groundwork for ongoing processes of conflict, cooperation, or
cooptation. It may help us understand the contingency of legal change
and the importance of individual choices. Law must reflect reason; to
understand it fully we must bear in mind that, particularly outside the
judicial context, it inevitably reflects much more.
B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994); Mary I. Coombs,
Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories 63 U. COLO. L. REV 683 (1992), Ed-
ward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80
CALIF. L .REv 889 (1992).
246 For a very thoughtful contemporary example of and reflection on narrative
legal scholarship, see Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law:
Restating the Power of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941 (2006).
247 One sub-category of narrative scholarship involves the recounting of sto-
ries in which the scholar-author played a role, but as a relatively minor character in a
story focusing on the client. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical
Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV.
1 (1990); Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993)
(introducing his article with a short narrative in which an indigent client sought legal
services from the article's author).
One quite prominent collective example of the use of stories in the writing of legal
academics is the collection of "Law Stories," providing a rich context, historical,
personal and political, for cases that students are likely to encounter in their case-
books, organized by doctrinal categories, such as property, legal ethics or immigra-
tion. A complete listing can be found at
http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/ProductLines.aspx?tab=l
248 Political theorists and political journalists, and the occasional law profes-
sor, have generally provided such closer studies of the political process. See, e.g.,
THOMAS A. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS IS
FAILING AMERICA AND How TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006),; SCHRAG, supra note
23 (focusing on the processes and effects of the citizen initiative in California);
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CuTs: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERrrED WEALTH (2005).
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